Blogs

The article argues that the Founders believed a well-informed citizenry is essential to self-government, but today’s information environment makes that harder than ever. It explains that being “well-informed” isn’t just about consuming a lot of information—it requires balancing volume with variety, because overload plus confirmation bias can leave citizens simultaneously overexposed and underprepared to think critically, making individual effort and responsibility more important than ever.

The “Trump Corollary” is redefining U.S.-Latin America policy as a results-driven, outsourced enforcement model: Washington shifts the hardest political and legal burdens — migration control, detention, and security crackdowns — to willing regional partners in exchange for money, leverage, and diplomatic favor. This approach may deliver fast, visible wins, but it also strengthens illiberal governance, increases reputational and legal risk for the U.S., and creates a fragile form of regional stability that can backfire into deeper insecurity, resentment, and future displacement.

The article contrasts two historical U.S. foreign-policy models in the Western Hemisphere — Theodore Roosevelt’s interventionist Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which justified direct military and economic control to enforce order and U.S. interests, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, which emphasized nonintervention, respect for sovereignty, and cooperative relations; it uses this comparison to suggest lessons for contemporary U.S. actions in Latin America.

The article contends that Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” signals a return to hard-power interventionism in Latin America that echoes the Roosevelt Corollary, reviving strategies that historically entrenched communist regimes rather than dismantling them. By overlooking the political, economic, and historical drivers of instability — and misreading both Cuban resilience and Russian priorities — the approach risks undermining long-term U.S. influence, which the author argues can only be secured through sustained diplomacy and regional partnership, not force.

Moldova’s withdrawal from the Russian-led CIS marks a decisive geopolitical break that strips Moscow of a key lever in the post-Soviet space and heightens the risk that Russia will activate Transnistria as a pretext for escalation. The article argues that this move could open a short, high-risk window in which Russia seeks to destabilize Moldova and threaten Odesa, aiming to landlock Ukraine and reshape the war’s geometry before its own logistical limits force a halt.

The article argues that Russia’s war against Ukraine is a coherent, long-term strategy focused on territorial consolidation, maritime dominance, and economic strangulation — aimed ultimately at landlocking Ukraine by seizing or neutralizing its Black Sea access. It warns that Western political fragmentation and mixed signals, alongside Russia’s likely use of Moldova as a low-risk testing ground, could enable a decisive spring offensive that reshapes Eastern Europe’s security balance and tests NATO’s resolve.

This article argues that U.S. policy decisions across four administrations — ranging from Obama’s restrained response to Crimea, Trump’s inconsistent aid posture, Biden’s industrialized support during full‑scale war, and Trump’s current ceasefire diplomacy — collectively informed Russian strategy by signaling thresholds of American commitment.

The survival of free states has never depended solely on professional armies or foreign alliances. At the heart of republican resilience lies a deeper principle: the willingness of ordinary citizens to take up arms in defense of liberty. This tradition, articulated by Niccolò Machiavelli in the Renaissance and tested in countless struggles since, remains vital today.

Norwich’s Cavalry Troop blends historic tradition with hands-on horsemanship and leadership, where cadets learn to ride, care for horses, and grow as citizen-leaders at Cedar Ridge Farm under expert trainer Kim Bisson.

For the purpose of accustoming the cadets to hardship and fatigue, and also for the purpose of instructing them more perfectly in the practical duties of the soldier, they will perform at least one march as a military corps, each year. – Captain Alden Partridge, Prospectus, 1825