Strategic Studies in War, Diplomacy, and the Modern World

Disclaimer: These opinion pieces represent the authors’ personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of Norwich University or PAWC.

Strategic Studies is the discipline devoted to understanding how political communities use both force and non-force instruments to secure their interests in an international environment defined by competition, uncertainty, and the ever-present possibility of conflict. It sits at the intersection of military history, political theory, international relations, economics, and diplomacy, drawing on each to explain how states pursue security, deter aggression, and shape the global order. At its core, Strategic Studies examines the relationship between political ends and the military, diplomatic, and economic means used to achieve them. It is a discipline concerned not only with war but also with the prevention of war; not only with power but also with responsible management of power; not only with conflict but also with the pursuit of a durable and just peace.

The modern world is marked by rapid geopolitical change. Nations interact through dense networks of trade, diplomacy, and security cooperation, yet they remain divided by competing interests, cultural differences, and historical grievances. Strategic Studies provide intellectual tools to navigate this complexity. It teaches leaders to understand state motivations, the dynamics of deterrence, the limits of coercion, and the opportunities for diplomacy. It offers a framework for analyzing crises, evaluating risks, and designing policies that align national objectives with available resources. In doing so, it equips practitioners to manage the political, economic, and cultural challenges of an interconnected world.

Norwich University, the oldest private military college in the United States, holds a distinct place in this intellectual tradition. Its Strategic Studies programs are grounded in a legacy of military professionalism, civic responsibility, and academic rigor. Norwich’s approach integrates classical strategic theory with contemporary global issues, preparing leaders to operate effectively in environments where diplomacy, military power, and economic statecraft converge. The university’s commitment to experiential learning, ethical leadership, and interdisciplinary analysis positions it to train the next generation of strategic thinkers.

Classical Foundations of Strategic Thought

The intellectual foundations of Strategic Studies rest on a canon of classic works that have shaped scholars’ and practitioners’ understanding of war, power, and statecraft for centuries. Among these are the writings of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, B. H. Liddell Hart, Niccolò Machiavelli, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett, George F. Kennan, and John Boyd. Their insights remain indispensable for analyzing contemporary security challenges.

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is a seminal piece for scholars of strategy and has been studied by warrior-scholars for thousands of years. The Art of War remains one of the foundational texts of strategic studies because it conceptualizes strategy as the integration of political objectives, intelligence, deception, timing, and adaptability rather than simply the application of military force. Sun Tzu argued that the highest form of strategy is to achieve political objectives while minimizing the costs of conflict, emphasizing information superiority, deception, and the manipulation of an adversary’s perceptions and decision-making processes.

Clausewitz’s On War provides the philosophical core of strategic studies. He argues that war is “a continuation of politics by other means,” anchoring strategy firmly in political purpose. For Clausewitz, war is never autonomous; it is shaped by statesmen’s aims, populations’ passions, and the uncertainties of the battlefield. His concept of friction, the accumulation of unforeseen difficulties that disrupt even the best-designed plans, remains one of the most important contributions to strategic thought. Clausewitz teaches that strategy must be adaptable, grounded in judgment, and responsive to changing circumstances. He also emphasizes identifying an enemy’s center of gravity, the source of its strength, and directing effort toward it to achieve decisive results.^[1]

Jomini, writing in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, sought to make strategy a rational, scientific discipline. His Précis de l’Art de la Guerre outlines a system of fixed principles, interior lines, decisive points, and concentration of force that he believed could guide commanders to victory. Jomini’s geometric conception of the battlefield, emphasizing maneuver and the rational arrangement of forces, shaped military education throughout the nineteenth century.^[2]

Helmuth Graf von Moltke “the Elder”, though influenced by both Clausewitz and Jomini, departed from their systems by emphasizing flexibility and decentralized execution. His dictum that “no plan survives contact with the enemy” reflects his belief that war is too complex to be governed by rigid rules. Moltke’s development of mission-type orders (Auftragstaktik) empowered subordinate commanders to act independently within the commander’s intent, creating a more agile and responsive force. His reforms of the Prussian General Staff institutionalized continuous planning, war gaming, and intelligence analysis, transforming strategy from an individual art into a collective enterprise.^[3]

Liddell Hart, reacting to the horrors of the First World War, argued for an indirect approach to strategy. In Strategy, he contends that the most effective path to victory lies not in frontal assaults against an enemy’s strongest defenses, but in psychological and operational dislocation. By striking where the enemy least expects, the strategist can impose surprise, uncertainty, and imbalance, compelling the opponent to yield without excessive bloodshed. Liddell Hart also emphasized the importance of mobility and mechanization, arguing that armored forces could restore maneuverability to the battlefield.^[4]

Machiavelli, writing centuries earlier, offers the earliest modern articulation of the relationship between political authority and military capability. In The Prince and The Art of War, he argues that the state’s survival depends on strong institutions, disciplined citizen militias, and prudent leadership. He emphasizes adaptability, insisting that fortune favors leaders who anticipate change and act decisively when circumstances shift.^[5]

Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian S. Corbett, the leading theorists of maritime strategy, offer complementary visions of sea power. Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History argues that national greatness depends on maritime strength—control of sea lines of communication, protection of commerce, and decisive fleet engagements.^[6] Corbett, in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, offers a more politically nuanced view, contending that command of the sea is rarely absolute and that naval power must be understood within the broader context of national objectives.^[7]

During the Cold War, George F. Kennan offered a model of restrained, long-term competition. His theory of containment, articulated in the “Long Telegram” and the X article, holds that the United States should resist Soviet expansion through patient, calibrated measures rather than direct confrontation. Kennan emphasizes the moral and psychological dimensions of statecraft, warning against militarizing foreign policy or pursuing objectives disconnected from the national interest.^[8]

Finally, during the latter half of the 20^th century, John Boyd fundamentally transformed modern strategic thinking by developing the Observe–Orient–Decide–Act (OODA) Loop, a decision-making model that emphasizes speed, adaptability, and continuous learning in competitive environments.^[9] The OODA Loop has become a foundational concept in many disciplines, including business strategy, cybersecurity, and national security decision-making. Boyd argued that victory is not achieved through superior firepower alone, but by operating inside an adversary’s decision cycle, creating uncertainty and disorientation that degrade their ability to respond effectively. The relevance of the OODA Loop has grown considerably in the age of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies. AI-enabled systems can dramatically accelerate observation, data fusion, and decision support, thereby compressing decision cycles from minutes to milliseconds. At the same time, advances in autonomous systems, cyber operations, and algorithmic warfare challenge traditional notions of human control and strategic judgment. Consequently, contemporary military organizations must not only leverage AI to enhance the speed and quality of decision-making but also ensure that human commanders retain the capacity to orient strategically, question machine-generated recommendations, and adapt to adversaries that employ AI-enabled capabilities. In this sense, Boyd’s framework remains central to understanding competitive advantage in an increasingly intelligent and machine-accelerated battlespace.

Together, these thinkers form a comprehensive strategic canon by uniting politics, principles, adaptability, psychology, and power into a single, enduring framework for understanding war and diplomacy.

“D” Diplomacy, Collective Security, and the NATO Strategic Concept

Diplomacy is a structural pillar of Strategic Studies, and its modern expression appears in the NATO Strategic Concept, which outlines the alliance’s commitment to collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.^[10] NATO’s emphasis on dialogue, partnership, and deterrence reflects the integration of classical strategic principles with contemporary geopolitical realities.

Diplomacy also plays a vital role in shaping the strategic environment. Through negotiation, alliances, and international cooperation, states can reduce tensions, build trust, and establish mechanisms for collective security. It enables states to manage crises, resolve disputes, and pursue shared interests without resorting to force. It is a tool for building bridges between nations, fostering dialogue, and promoting stability.

Machiavelli’s insistence on prudent leadership and adaptability underscores the importance of diplomacy in navigating uncertainty.^[11] Kennan’s emphasis on political realism and calibrated responses reinforces the need for diplomatic subtlety and restraint.^[12] Corbett’s maritime strategy, which integrates naval operations with political objectives, highlights the inseparability of diplomacy and military power.^[13]

Collective defense arrangements, such as NATO, embody the principle that peace is best preserved when states act together to deter aggression and manage crises. Strategic Studies teaches that alliances must be credible, cohesive, and aligned with political objectives. The NATO Strategic Concept reflects this by emphasizing readiness, interoperability, and shared values.^[14]

“I” Information Warfare

Information is another instrument of military power, which shapes how states compete, deter adversaries, and achieve strategic objectives in an increasingly connected security environment. Information operations seek to influence perceptions, decision-making, behavior, and the cognitive processes of both adversaries and populations. This emphasis on decision advantage reflects a broader understanding of competition in which success depends not only on possessing superior capabilities but also on the ability to process information, adapt rapidly, and act more effectively than an opponent. John Boyd’s Observe–Orient–Decide–Act (OODA) Loop serves as a foundational doctrine because he highlights the importance of gaining informational and cognitive advantages by accelerating one’s own decision cycle while disrupting that of an adversary. Through influence operations, cyber capabilities, and the manipulation of information environments, states and non-state actors can undermine trust, alter perceptions, disrupt command and control, and achieve strategic effects without relying solely on conventional military force.

In response to geopolitical changes, in 2025, Norwich’s Strategic Studies curriculum expanded to include dedicated coursework in Information and Cognitive Warfare. The coursework examines the strategic use of disinformation, misinformation, and influence operations in the digital domain, with particular attention to how state and non-state actors exploit cyberspace and emerging technologies to achieve political and military objectives.

The “M” in DIME – ‘Military’

The military instrument of national power is possibly the most central component of statecraft, providing governments with the capability to deter aggression, defend national interests, and shape the international security environment. However, effective use of military power requires far more than the application of force; it demands a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between political objectives, strategic decision-making, and the means available to achieve desired outcomes. As Clausewitz emphasized, war is a continuation of politics by other means, showing the necessity of aligning military action with broader national objectives.

Similarly, contemporary strategic thought highlights that military power must be wholly integrated with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to achieve sustainable strategic effects. Norwich University’s Strategic Studies programs are dedicated to developing this comprehensive understanding of military power by examining not only the operational employment of armed forces but also the political, historical, technological, and ethical dimensions that shape their use. Through a curriculum grounded in strategic theory and informed by the experiences of military practitioners, the Strategic Studies programs prepare Norwich students to critically analyze how military capabilities can be effectively employed as part of a broader national strategy in an increasingly complex security environment.

“E” Economic Cooperation, Development, and the U.S. National Security Strategy

Economic cooperation and development address the root causes of instability. The U.S. National Security Strategy consistently emphasizes economic strength, free trade, and international development as foundations of national and global security.^[15]

Mahan’s emphasis on commerce and maritime infrastructure highlights the economic foundations of sea power.^[16] Machiavelli’s focus on strong institutions underscores the importance of economic stability for political survival.^[17] Economic ties can often serve as a stabilizing force in regions marked by historical rivalries. The Strategic Studies programs at Norwich incorporate economic analysis to assess how resources, trade, and industrial capacity shape national power.

Economic statecraft, including sanctions, trade agreements, and development assistance, has become a central instrument for modern strategists. It enables states to influence behavior, build partnerships, and promote stability without resorting to force. Strategic Studies teaches leaders to integrate economic instruments along with diplomatic and military tools to achieve political objectives.

Norwich University’s Role

Norwich University offers undergraduate and graduate instruction in Strategic Studies that combines academic rigor with a deep understanding of military professionalism and civic responsibility. The Strategic Studies department offers two undergraduate degree programs: a Bachelor of Science in National Security Studies and a Bachelor of Science in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis (SSDA). The SSDA program is highly unique in that it was developed as a degree-completion pathway specifically designed to meet the educational needs of members of the U.S. Special Operations Forces community. Through partnerships with the Global SOF Foundation (GSOF) and Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), the program also offers scholarships to military personnel from allied NATO countries, fostering an international learning environment grounded in shared security challenges. Several of the U.S.’s highest-ranking senior enlisted members are graduates of the program.

At the graduate level, the department offers a Master of Arts in Strategic Studies and a Master of Arts in Defense Policy. The faculty combine academic scholarship with extensive practitioner experience, with many having served on the faculties of U.S. professional military education institutions, including the nation’s war colleges, and bring decades of operational and policy experience to the classroom. This integration of theory and practice is intended to prepare students for leadership roles across the military, government, and national security sectors.

The approach is grounded in classical strategic theory. Students study the foundational works, learning to apply their insights to contemporary challenges. This classical grounding is complemented by the DIME framework at the graduate level and in politics, history, economics, intelligence, law, and security studies.

Conclusion

Strategic Studies is the discipline that explains how states use war and diplomacy to achieve their goals. It integrates military, political, economic, and diplomatic dimensions into a coherent framework for understanding international relations. The classical theorists, including Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, Liddell Hart, Machiavelli, Mahan, Corbett, Kennan, and Boyd, provide the intellectual foundations of this field, offering insights that remain essential to analyzing contemporary security challenges.

The Department of Strategic Studies is committed to continuously adapting its curriculum to reflect evolving geopolitical dynamics and the changing nature of conflict while still preserving its focus on the foundations of strategic thought. For instance, the department recently added a Hybrid Warfare course, co-designed with retired CIA officer Mark Chadason, that explores the increasingly contested space between peace and conventional war by examining integrated political, informational, cyber, economic, and military instruments of power. The course includes a one-week residency at Norwich University’s CityLab in Berlin, Germany, where students analyze contemporary security challenges in the context of European and transatlantic security.

Looking ahead, the department plans to expand its coverage of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and autonomous systems; introduce specialized coursework on Chinese strategy and strategic thought; and offer more immersion opportunities with NATO partners. Through this approach, the department seeks to maintain its institutional relevance by ensuring that its educational programs evolve with strategic, technological, and geopolitical developments, preparing graduates to understand today’s security challenges and anticipate those of the future.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. He attended high school in Heinavesi, Finland. He spent most of his Marine Corps career as an operations chief, serving deployments in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. He serves as a Senior Fellow at the Patton Center for Peace and War at Norwich University. His published doctoral dissertation focuses on the role of ethnic Germans in early American history. His published works can be found in Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, Voices on Peace and War, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

Dr. Diane M. Zorri is the Academic Director of the Strategic Studies program at Norwich University. She specializes in emerging technology, Middle East politics, American foreign and defense policy, and NATO and defense industry affairs. She has held academic positions at the National Defense College of the United Arab Emirates, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, Florida, and John Cabot University in Rome, Italy. Before transitioning to academia, Dr. Zorri served as an officer in the United States Air Force. After her military service, she worked for an Italian-U.S. defense conglomerate, managing projects in foreign military sales, integrated communications, and physical security. Dr. Zorri’s educational background includes a degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy, a graduate degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.

^[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1832).

^[2] Antoine‑Henri Jomini, Précis de l’Art de la Guerre (1838).

^[3] Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings (1893).

^[4] B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954).

^[5] Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532); The Art of War (1521).

^[6] Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890).

^[7] Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911).

^[8] George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (1951); “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (1947).

^[9] John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, compiled by Grant T. Hammond, Air University Press, 2018 (original briefings 1976–1995).

^[10] NATO, Strategic Concept (2022).

^[11] Machiavelli, The Prince.

^[12] Kennan, American Diplomacy.

^[13] Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.

^[14] NATO, Strategic Concept (2022).

^[15] The White House, National Security Strategy (2022).

^[16] Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History.

^[17}Machiavelli, The Art of War.