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Russia’s Authoritarian Peacebuilding in Mali: Stability as a Mirage
By Denisha Johnson-Yates
Mali exemplifies how overlapping crises—state fragility, jihadist insurgency, and great-power competition—have created openings for external actors, particularly Russia, whose security support prioritizes regime survival and resource extraction rather than stability or reform. Disillusionment with Western interventions, especially France and the UN, led Mali’s junta to embrace Russia’s “security without conditions” model, which appeals to authoritarian leaders but has worsened violence, exploited gold resources, and deepened instability. Ultimately, Mali’s case highlights a broader shift toward authoritarian peacebuilding in Africa, where sovereignty is used to shield regimes from accountability, raising concerns that future peace operations may prioritize geopolitical influence over civilian protection and sustainable conflict resolution.
Disclaimer: These opinion pieces represent the authors’ personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of Norwich University or PAWC.
Africa today sits at a strategic crossroads, confronting overlapping pressures from post-colonial state fragility, extremist violence, and intensifying competition among external powers. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Sahel, specifically in Mali, which faces multiple crises simultaneously: state collapse, a resilient jihadist insurgency, great-power rivalry, and a resource curse. The combination of these crises led to Mali becoming a fragile state. This type of fragility creates openings for external actors. Russia leverages Mali’s instability to gain access to resources, revealing that its security services do not bring stability at all. Specifically, Russia has been involved in the country, providing security to the Malian regime. They entrench authoritarian rule while projecting the illusion of security.
Why Mali Turned Away From the West
The fear from Western states such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France over rising Islamic radicalism and global terrorism has shaped much of their renewed international engagement in Africa, particularly in Somalia and Mali.[1] In February 2013, France initiated a military intervention against the jihadist takeover of North Mali, in both Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane.[2] These interventions reflected not only counterterrorism priorities but also deeper assumptions about how peace could be built in fragile states. Despite their efforts, France and the United Nations repeatedly clashed with Mali’s junta. The French-Malian relationship has been strained as France has expressed concerns about changes in the junta’s authoritarian political system. Hence, Russia’s Wagner Group offered a more compelling alternative to Mali. It is here that Mali’s trajectory intersects with broader debates in peacebuilding.
Mirage of Stability
The Turaeg rebellion of 2012 prompted military coups and the emergence of jihadist groups, forcing the Malian government to topple. In the process of attempting to maintain power, the Malian regime needed protection from the jihadist groups and chose Russia. The gradual shift away from the West made Russia the perfect choice, along with the promise of high-caliber security. Russia’s contract is simple: Russia would provide security for the Malian junta from the jihadist groups to prevent them from taking over the government.
Originally, the Wagner Group, now known as the Africa Corps, failed this mission. Instead of providing security, the mercenaries have exploited the natural resources Mali has in gold, exacerbated terrorist recruiting, and undeniably added to hundreds of civilian deaths, including the 2022 Moura massacre. Russia agrees to provide security to regimes solely - the idea that it is completely different from the West in that they will not provide opinions on how the regime should be operated and not provide conditions (no strings attached) in order to provide the security.
This is favorable to authoritarian regimes that want to stay in power as long as possible. However, this is not always the case in that Russia almost always props up authoritarian regimes, suppresses oppositions, and influences media narratives, including their own behaviors. Most infamously, Russia does security-for-resources. Knowing that Mali’s main source of its GDP is gold, Russia provides this security, or fails to do so, with the stipulation of receiving this gold.
Russia’s Authoritarian Peacebuilding Model
Russia’s entry through the Wagner Group made a decisive turn toward authoritarian peacebuilding. Russia embodies authoritarian peacebuilding, prioritizing regime survival and resource extraction. The clash between liberal and authoritarian peacebuilding models these models left Mali caught in the middle, with sovereignty invoked not to protect citizens but to shield the junta from external accountability. Wagner offered what France and the UN would not. For Mali’s junta, this was attractive. It allowed them to consolidate power, suppress insurgents, and avoid external pressure for reform. The deterioration of French-Malian relations after the 2020 coup reflects a deeper incompatibility between liberal counterterrorism, which relies on political legitimacy and reform, and authoritarian security governance, which prioritizes regime survival and sovereignty over accountability. The Malian junta, facing repeated coups and insurgency, rejected these conditions as neoliberal interference. Russia’s Wagner Group offered an alternative - security without reform, protection without accountability. This authoritarian model appealed to Mali’s rulers precisely because it allowed them to sustain authoritarian governance while still receiving external support.
Why did Mali turn to Russia? Wagner Group, a mercenary company that works on behalf of the Russian government, offered something the French did not. Security without governance conditions. The Malian government wanted to maintain authoritarian governance but needed protection from insurgents, making the Wagner Group more desirable.
Gold-for-Security Bargain
Mali is the second-largest gold producer in Africa, producing 70,000 kilograms of gold, worth $2.5 billion annually. Despite this, ali exemplifies the common “resource curse”: riches amid fragility.[3] Similar to China’s neocolonial behavior in Africa, Russia’s involvement with Mali is transactional, with security assistance in exchange for access to Mali’s gold reserves. This model not only provided Moscow with alternative revenue streams to go around Western sanctions but also extended its geopolitical footprint in the Sahel.[4]
Cost of Illusion
At the heart of this clash lies the question of sovereignty in peace operations. Liberal peacebuilding often challenges sovereignty by demanding reforms that constrain regime power, while authoritarian peacebuilding reinforces sovereignty by shielding regimes from external accountability. Mali’s shift from France and the UN toward Russia reflects a broader trend in the Sahel. Sovereignty is increasingly invoked not to protect citizens, but to defend regimes against external pressures. In Mali, an initial France-Russia rivalry shifted into a contest between a Russia-backed junta and jihadist insurgents, driving a turn toward authoritarian peacebuilding, in which regime security and geopolitical alignment replaced civilian protection and political reconciliation as the primary goals of peace operations.
This is yet another lesson learned that liberal peacekeeping is ineffective when host governments reject reform. The true definition is that you cannot help those who do not want help. For many observers, Mali represents a credibility crisis. If the UN cannot stabilize a country with massive international support, what does this mean for its ability to manage future conflicts - in the Sahel or beyond? If authoritarian peacebuilding becomes the dominant model, African states may increasingly resist external accountability, weakening continental efforts to promote democratic governance and human rights.
We see this throughout Africa, and it has implications for future missions in other fragile states, such as Somalia, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. These other states share Mali’s characteristics: weak institutions, insurgent threats, and external competition. Mali demonstrates that peacekeeping missions cannot succeed without host-state buy-in, and the external actors offering unconditional security, such as Russia, may outcompete liberal interventions. For the UN and Western states, this raises a strategic dilemma. Should they continue to tie assistance to reform, risking rejection, or adapt to a multipolar environment where authoritarian models are gaining traction? Finally, Mali underscores the geopolitical dimension of peacebuilding. The Sahel is no longer just a regional crisis; it is a testing ground for global competition. Russia’s transactional model of exchanging security for resources challenges the liberal peacebuilding consensus and offers authoritarian regimes a viable alternative. If this model spreads, peace operations may increasingly become arenas of confrontation between major powers rather than instruments of stabilization. The result is a world where peacekeeping is less about protecting civilians and more about projecting influence.
Mali is no more secure. It is simply more controlled. Russia’s model offers the illusion of stability while deepening the very conditions that fuel conflict. If this model spreads, peacekeeping will no longer be about protecting civilians. It will be about protecting regimes.
My recommendation for Western states is to step back from directing stabilization efforts and adopt a supporting role. Western states need to recalibrate their engagement in Mali by enabling, rather than leading, peace and security initiatives. African institutions such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States are better positioned to guide political and security responses within the Sahel due to their regional legitimacy to guide political and security responses in the Sahel, while the United Nations should reinforce accountability of Russia’s actions through sanctions and human rights monitoring. Western engagement should focus on enabling African-led solutions through technical assistance and diplomatic support.
Denisha Johnson-Yates holds a B.A. in Political Science with a concentration in International Relations from UCLA and M.A. in Diplomacy with a concentration in Conflict Management from Norwich University. She currently commands a company at Fort Jackson, South Carolina and previously served in Korea with Eighth Army and United Nations Command, where she worked on U.S.-ROK land transfer agreements. Her work examines how power, security, and external influence shape states and societies across the world.
[3] CEIC Data, Mali Gold Production, 1990 - 2021, CEIC Data, December 2024.
