The Arctic Commons and US Power Projection

Disclaimer: These opinion pieces represent the authors’ personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of Norwich University or PAWC.

America — An Arctic Nation

The Arctic is undergoing unprecedented transformation. This transformation is environmental and has implications for long-established geopolitical frameworks. Climate change is reshaping access to the Arctic Ocean as retreating sea ice has revealed new shipping lanes, resource extraction opportunities, and vulnerabilities, from undersea cables to unmonitored maritime approaches. Concurrently, amid the return of great power competition, state competitors actively seek to capitalize on this shift. For its part, Russia has reactivated Soviet-era Arctic bases, deployed hypersonic missile systems to its Northern Fleet, and conducted annual nuclear readiness drills above the 70th parallel [1]. Conversely, despite lacking Arctic geography, China has declared itself a “Near-Arctic State” according to the Polar Silk Road policy [2]. While emphasizing the need to access the global commons, China has expanded its Belt and Road initiative, investing in dual-use polar infrastructure and securing energy partnerships with Russia.

The U.S. is an Arctic-oriented nation, solely due to Alaska, and its geographical positioning provides a strategic location from which to project the nation’s interests into the region and beyond. However, Alaska’s initial purchase was not seen as a pivotal acquisition for the nation as it navigated reconstruction efforts following the conclusion of the Civil War. A popular legend over the nearly 160 years since Alaska’s purchase purports that at the time many Americans were unsatisfied with the acquisition, describing Secretary of State William Seward’s purchase of the territory as a “folly” [3]. Though in the early years of the U.S.’s foray as an Arctic nation, Alaska remained underutilized despite Seward’s expectation that the territory would provide an opportunity to access markets throughout the Pacific. In the many decades since the purchase of the territory and its installation as the 49th state, the U.S. has come to realize Alaska’s importance amid natural resources, homeland defense, and the growing potential for access to emerging global markets.

From the lens of military power projection, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, an early proponent of American air power, saw the diamond in the rough that was Alaska. Just as Carl Von Clausewitz is commonly quoted for his commentary that war is an extension of policy, Mitchell falls into a similar grouping of historical people and the commentary that is attributed to them. Seeking to leverage Congress to perceive the military potential of the territory, Mitchell described a future in which “whoever holds Alaska will hold the world” [4]. He opined before Congress that “it is the most important strategic place in the world” [5]. Mitchell’s commentary on Alaska’s place in power projection has continued to reverberate through time and capture the imaginations of policymakers and military planners alike. Amid this continual appraisal of Alaska as an instrument for power projection, the U.S. has had to define its status as an Arctic power.

Levers of power projection — Combatant commands

As a lever of national power, U.S. combatant commands (COCOMs) provide far-ranging reach and scope, wielding military power to secure the ends of the nation’s geopolitical goals. Conversely, the Arctic as a region has straddled the responsibilities of three separate combatant commands. This shared security umbrella across U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) highlights each of the COCOMs’ challenges as they navigate aside their primary “theater.” The effect is that the Arctic is left with varying degrees of touchpoints, with USNORTHCOM being designated as the primary command but not solely responsible for the nation’s interests in the region. This undertaking to parse the region across these separate COCOMs provides “junctures” among these commands where the military planners and flag officers may inadvertently fail to synergize efforts amid competing operational plan (OPLAN) requirements. Moreover, within this space, policymakers and military leaders must recognize the emerging security requirements originating from within the Arctic. As the return of great power competition brings forth acute risks to the “Arctic Commons” and U.S. interests in the region, there will be a subsequent need to generate OPLANs as conditions become more acute. Hence, OPLAN development, resourcing, and budgetary considerations will require a command that is congressionally mandated to view the Arctic as its primary area of focus.
As the U.S., its strategic competitors, allies, and partners seek to strengthen their access to the region, the Arctic is anticipated to encounter increasing levels of friction below the liminal threshold of open conflict. Addressing the need to establish a headquarters that acknowledges this evolving geopolitical landscape is essential to ensuring freedom of navigation and access to emerging maritime trade routes and natural resources. A proposed Arctic-focused joint headquarters would give the nation a better position to act strategically. This position would advance U.S. objectives in the region, provide essential command and control across the joint force, and enable the United States to secure access, exert influence, and act amid the increasingly complex geopolitical dynamics of the Arctic. A headquarters of this nature will enhance the U.S.’s capability to respond to its national interests, assert its dominance in the region, and ensure that the finite resources of the military are adequately resourced from the legislative process.

Examination of the U.S.’s Unified Command Plan (UCP) and how COCOMs are arrayed is an essential part of deterring the U.S.’s adversaries and delivering the combined weight of the U.S. military anywhere and at any time throughout the globe. Consequently, as the Arctic increasingly becomes a topic of consideration to both U.S. security and accessibility to the greater global commons, the region presents a gap within the UCP. China and Russia have achieved a significant head start in shaping the Arctic Commons to meet their needs, while leaving the U.S. to scramble and commit resources elsewhere. Therefore, there is an essential need to investigate the necessity for an Arctic-focused joint command that seeks to consolidate command and control while streamlining resource allocation across the joint force. The evolving strategic significance of the Arctic demands a decisive structural response from within the Department of War that recognizes the growing significance of the circumpolar region to not only homeland defense but also the implications of rapid power projection into the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and beyond. Furthermore, it ensures access to the greater global commons and adherence to the rules-based order of long-standing international frameworks. Rather than continuing to divide responsibilities across multiple combatant commands, policymakers and flag officers should evaluate the need for a unified formation that centralizes decision-making and optimizes military effectiveness in a theater that is anticipated to become increasingly contested.

In early 2023, Americans throughout the nation were to spot a foreign object as it glided across the sky for several weeks. A high-altitude balloon had been launched from China, equipped with what was described as robust surveillance equipment, estimated to be the size of several school buses cobbled together [6]. This craft was designed to traverse from China across the Pacific Ocean, cross the Aleutian Islands to Alaska, and eventually travel through Canada and the “lower 48” of the United States. Along its route, this solar-powered vessel was to deliberately cross various critical sites that impact U.S. national security. All the while, everyday Americans were able to spot the spy balloon’s travels as it slowly journeyed across the nation, speculating about its purpose, where it originated, and fueling conspiracy theories. Eventually, this craft was targeted and eliminated by an F-22, an action first of its kind, just off the coast of South Carolina.

In this real-world example, this craft was to traverse across both USINDOPACOM and USNORTHCOM’s areas of responsibility. However, the balloon had also navigated across Alaska, traveling across the sub-unified command responsible for maintaining the nation’s airspace sovereignty in Alaska — Alaska Command (ALCOM). Following this incident, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) produced a report detailing the friction points in collaboration among USINDOPACOM, USNORTHCOM, and ALCOM. Highlighting the very seams that this discussion is examining amid the friction of the responsibilities of the Arctic divided. However, in the past year, those series of governmental reports are presently unavailable. Among them was a report that had been previously archived on the GAO website, which described a delay of up to 72 hours among the commands as information and coordination were passed along [7]. Though this report is no longer available, its contents would have illuminated the concern for potential delays among one command to the next to achieve effective responses.

Another facet to consider is the increasing number of incursions of the U.S.’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) off the coast of Alaska. ADIZ marks the defensive airspace for nations that have adopted the convention, as they seek to ensure an early warning response to any potential threats. For the U.S., this has meant scrambling sorties of F-35s and F-22s based in Alaska to respond to Russian exercises just shy of the U.S.’s ADIZ. Over the past few years, the response to potential ADIZ incursions has increased as Russia conducts strategic bomber exercises. Most concerning was when China and Russia conducted a joint bomber exercise, which involved flying through the ADIZ of Alaska. As highlighted by a roundtable discussion among security practitioners for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “this is the first time China and Russia have conducted a joint patrol near Alaska and in the northern Pacific” [8]. What is of further note for this joint patrol was “also the first time that Chinese and Russian aircraft have taken off [together] from the same Russian air base” [9].

These vignettes highlight that amid the return to great power competition, the U.S.’s adversaries recognize the strategic value of the Arctic and its subarctic approaches. Consequently, those adversaries have arrayed their resources to gain a head start in exploiting the region and militarizing their approaches to the Arctic Commons. The Sino-Russian influence on the region will determine the level of access the U.S. has to its Arctic shores. That is, if the U.S. fails to recognize the significance of the Arctic and subsequently shape appropriate responses that maintain the nation’s sovereignty and status as an Arctic nation. The U.S. must take steps that effectively deter China, Russia, or other states from seeking to militarize the Arctic Commons.

As touched upon in the opening vignettes and the subsequent research examining the threat to America’s Arctic footprint, it is evident that gaps exist among COCOMs. Although USNORTHCOM may have the operational lead to secure the Arctic Commons, this command is spread thin in addressing its primary concerns — counterterrorism, the southwest border, and defense support to civil authorities amid a myriad of natural disasters. Conversely, USINDOPACOM’s primary focus is in the Pacific, responding to several contingencies, including the danger of an annulment of the armistice between the Koreas, the implications of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and the defense pacts aimed at defending Japan and the Philippines, among others. Lastly, USEUCOM is focused on NATO integration, deterring Russian aggression, monitoring the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and being ready to defend and support European allies across the spectrum of warfare.
The “Arctic Commons” and the U.S. role in that emerging geopolitical region

In 2025, the Secretary of War announced a rebalancing of responsibilities across the UCP to ensure “a more robust defense of the western hemisphere and deepening relationships with Arctic allies and partners” [10]. Furthermore, the Trump Administration has pivoted the direction of national security, addressing the nation’s security concerns in what the present National Security Strategy describes as a reassertion to the Monroe Doctrine. With the aim “to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region” [11]. Consequently, this direction towards securing the nation’s approaches to and within the Western Hemisphere has seen the security considerations of Greenland transferred from USEUCOM to USNORTHCOM. Though with the periphery of Greenland now under the purview of USNORTHCOM, the Arctic is nevertheless not at the top of consideration for a COCOM focused on its primary responsibilities to plan, organize, and execute homeland defense and civil support missions. Furthermore, though USNORTHCOM has been tasked with conducting security cooperation endeavors with Greenland, all those conversations still occur directly with the Kingdom of Demark as there is not a dedicated U.S. Defense Attaché Office physically in the Danish territory.

USNORTHCOM’s primary responsibilities rest across homeland defense, the growing southwest border mission, and providing support to civil authorities rather than projecting power through a rapidly accessible Arctic Commons. Across these COCOMs, there is a gap in the nation’s Arctic frontier. The region itself has failed to garner any mention in the present National Security Strategy. Whereas in the National Defense Strategy, Greenland is treated as a vague economic chokepoint within the greater notion of a Western Hemisphere led by the U.S. The Arctic environment is harsh and unforgiving; it should not be shelfed or nestled to other policy considerations. China and Russia have achieved significant strides towards their strategic ends in the Arctic Commons. Accordingly, the U.S. must take steps towards investing in a unified command that understands and lives the Arctic, effectively communicate and achieve results amid the effective use of command and control across the joint operational environment, and understands how to account for the harsh terrain and extreme weather and its effects on logistical needs.

Action in the Arctic Commons is not just a response to a homeland defense OPLAN; it takes into account that climate change will redistribute global maritime trade and the ability to project the combat power envisioned by Billy Mitchell, within and well beyond the region. To ensure that the Arctic Commons remains a viable and cost-effective source of these burgeoning routes, a unified command, centered between the sea and air and supported by the land, space, and cyber domains, will be essential for the U.S. to secure its “high north.” Examining the Arctic through the lens of “where we were” and “where we are” to frame the strategic concerns of our high north is not enough. To answer “where we’re going” will be determined by our nation’s determination to acknowledge the call to shape the Arctic Commons and ensure that the U.S. embraces its Arctic frontiers.

1st Sgt. (Ret.) Emerson J. Sullivan is a strategic planning specialist and U.S. Army strategic studies graduate. Retiring earlier this year after over 23 years in the U.S. Army, he culminated his service with the headquarters of the historic 11th Airborne Division at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson. He has served across numerous assignments from conventional, airborne, and security force assistance organizations. He holds a Master of Arts in Military Studies with a concentration in strategic leadership. Emerson is also an alumnus of Norwich University with a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice (NU18), graduating magna cum laude. He further holds an additional undergraduate degree in military history. Emerson has the distinction of being a graduate of U.S. Army Pacific Command’s Regional Leader Development Program-Pacific in 2018. As a part of that fellowship, he studied in an immersion strategic studies program co-sponsored with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and went on to serve as a part of a delegation to Australia, Vietnam, and Singapore. Presently, he is pursuing an additional Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Global Security with Hawaii Pacific University.

References

[1] Buchanan, Elizabeth. 2023. Red Arctic- Russian Strategy Under Putin. Brookings Institution. 69-79.

[2] Burke, Ryan P. 2022. The Polar Pivot-Great Power Competition in the Arctic and Antarctica. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder, London. 100.

[3] Stahr, Walter. 2012. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man. Simon & Schuster. 487-488.

[4] Sarles, Harrison. 2020. Arctic Panel looks at the world from the top down. Note- Though this quote is often attributed to Mitchell across numerous sources, including this one, it is nevertheless not a part of the verbatim congressional record.

[5] ibid, 2020

[6] O’Rourke, Ronald (Coordinator). 2024. Changes in the Arctic- Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service.

[7] Government Office of Accountability. 2023.

[8] Williams, Heather; Bingen, Kari A.; and MacKenzie, Lachlan. 2024. “Why did China and Russia stage a joint bomber exercise near Alaska?”. Center for Strategic and International Relations.

[9] ibid, 2024

[10] U.S. Department of War, “Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman, Sean Parnell on the Unified Command Plan,” June 17, 2025.

[11] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, December 2025), 15.