The United States and the Crisis of Grand Strategy: Middle East Wars, Global Commitments, and the Challenge of Partisan Policy

Disclaimer: These opinion pieces represent the authors’ personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of Norwich University or PAWC.

Introduction

Since the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, the United States has been embroiled in a series of wars, interventions, and strategic realignments that have defined its role as a global power. Yet beneath the surface of American military and diplomatic activity lies a persistent structural weakness: the absence of a coherent, enduring grand national strategy. Over the past forty years, U.S. strategy has been shaped less by long-term vision than by the shifting tides of presidential administrations, congressional control, and partisan politics. This instability has jeopardized international alliances, undermined trust in American power, and destabilized both domestic and global economies. As the United States faces new threats — from the rise of China to the resurgence of Russia, and the challenges of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) — the need for a cohesive, non-partisan grand strategy has never been more urgent.

Middle East Wars and Strategic Incoherence

The Middle East has been the crucible of American strategic failure and inconsistency. From the Iran hostage crisis to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policy has oscillated between interventionism, containment, and withdrawal. The Gulf War of 1991, launched to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, was hailed as a model of decisive action and coalition leadership. Yet the subsequent wars in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2021) revealed the limits of American power and the dangers of strategic incoherence.

Paul D. Miller’s analysis of the Afghanistan war underscores the consequences of shifting priorities and contradictory goals. Miller argues that American defeat in Afghanistan was not inevitable but the result of a cumulative series of strategic errors, bureaucratic dysfunctions, and political vacillations spanning four presidencies. Each administration — Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden — made pivotal decisions that contributed to the mission’s unraveling, as the United States repeatedly oscillated among counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, state-building, and rapid disengagement.[i] The central tragedy, Miller contends, is that the U.S. failed not at warfighting but at statecraft, never building the political foundations necessary for enduring success.[ii]

The Iraq War further illustrates the dangers of strategic drift. The initial invasion in 2003 was justified by claims of weapons of mass destruction and the promise of democratization. Yet the absence of a clear post-war plan, the failure to anticipate sectarian violence, and the rapid turnover of political leadership within Iraq led to years of instability and conflict. The Obama administration’s withdrawal in 2011, followed by the rise of ISIS and renewed intervention, exemplifies the cyclical nature of American engagement in the region.

The Global War on Terror and Policy Shifts

The GWOT, launched in response to the September 11 attacks, has been marked by a series of shifting strategies and priorities. The initial focus on Afghanistan and al-Qaeda soon expanded to Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and beyond. Drone strikes, special operations, and targeted killings became central tools of American policy, yet the lack of a coherent grand strategy led to mission creep, legal ambiguity, and diplomatic fallout.

Andrew J. Bacevich’s critique of American militarism highlights the dangers of overreach and ideological distortion. Bacevich argues that the United States is seduced by the idea of military solutions, driven by civil-military romanticism, evangelical narratives, neoconservative ideology, and public disengagement from the costs of war.[iii] The result is repeated intervention, unrealistic goals, and a political environment in which leaders promise decisive outcomes that the military cannot deliver.[iv] This environment fosters economic instability, as military spending and interventionist policies fluctuate with political cycles, undermining both domestic fiscal discipline and global economic confidence.

Policy Toward Europe: From Alliance Leadership to Strategic Ambiguity

U.S. policy toward Europe has undergone dramatic shifts over the past four decades. The end of the Cold War brought hopes of a “peace dividend” and the expansion of NATO, yet recent years have seen a retreat from traditional commitments and growing uncertainty about American leadership. The Obama administration’s cautious response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Trump administration’s ambivalent stance toward NATO, and the Biden administration’s renewed support for Ukraine all reflect the absence of a consistent grand strategy.

James M. Deitch’s analysis of U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine shows how cumulative choices shaped Russian expectations and negotiation leverage. Deitch treats U.S. policy as a signaling system, showing how restraint, inconsistency, escalation, and accommodation collectively created a strategic environment that Moscow learned to exploit.[v] The lesson is clear: deterrence is not abstract but communicative, and adversaries calibrate their strategies to American thresholds.[vi] The lack of coherent signaling and sustained commitment has undermined alliance trust and emboldened adversaries.

The Trump Doctrine: America First and the New Monroe Doctrine

The Trump administration marked a radical departure from previous U.S. strategy, embracing an “America First” approach and a new iteration of the Monroe Doctrine. This policy prioritized American interests, withdrew from traditional commitments to Europe and Japan, and sought to recalibrate U.S. engagement in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.

The shifts in U.S. policy toward Ukraine, Taiwan, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Middle East reflect a broader shift in grand strategy. While identifying China as the number one global threat, the Trump administration simultaneously appeased Russia, withdrew from multilateral agreements, and emphasized bilateral deals. The prioritization of American interests over alliance commitments has raised questions about the sustainability of this strategy and its consequences for global stability.

Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich’s historical analysis underscores the plurality of American strategy, showing that no single “American way” dominates all eras.[vii] The coexistence of multiple “ways of war,” shaped by era, region, technology, and political context, is not a strength but a symptom of the absence of grand strategy.[viii] The United States’ inability to sustain a coherent strategic vision undermines its ability to project power, protect allies, and ensure international peace.

The Challenge of China and the Limits of Strategic Realignment

The rise of China as a global power has forced the United States to reassess its strategic priorities. While successive administrations have identified China as the primary threat to American interests, the absence of a grand strategy has led to inconsistent policies and missed opportunities. The Trump administration’s trade war, the Biden administration’s focus on Indo-Pacific alliances, and ongoing debates over Taiwan and the South China Sea reflect the challenges of strategic realignment.

At the same time, appeasing Russia and retreating from traditional commitments to Europe and Japan have weakened the credibility of American power. The prioritization of “America First” may not be sustainable, and its survival beyond the Trump administration is uncertain. The risk is that the United States will continue to oscillate between competing priorities, undermining its ability to lead and protect its allies.

Toward a Cohesive, Non-Partisan Grand Strategy

The lessons of the past forty years are clear: the absence of a grand strategy has jeopardized American power, alliances, and economic stability. The United States must develop a cohesive, nonpartisan grand strategy that stands apart from electoral cycles and party platforms. This strategy should prioritize clear signaling, sustained commitment, and the integration of military, diplomatic, and economic tools.

A grand strategy must be grounded in long-term vision, not short-term political gain. It should recognize the interconnectedness of global threats, the importance of alliances, and the need for credible deterrence. The United States must move beyond the cycles of intervention and withdrawal, embrace strategic clarity, and restore trust in its leadership.

Conclusion

The United States stands at a crossroads. The wars of the past forty years, shifts in policy toward Europe, the GWOT, and the Trump Doctrine have exposed the dangers of strategic incoherence and partisan politics. As China rises and Russia exploits American ambiguity, the need for a grand strategy has never been more urgent. The United States must develop a cohesive, enduring vision that transcends party platforms and electoral cycles, restores trust in its power, and ensures international peace and stability.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During his Marine Corps career, he deployed to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. His published works can be found in USNI’s Proceedings, Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[i] Paul D. Miller, Choosing Defeat: The Twenty-Year Saga of How America Lost Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] James M. Deitch, “Signals and Consequences: How U.S. Policy Shaped Russian Strategy and Negotiation Leverage in Ukraine, 2014-2025,” Journal of Peace and War, January 2026.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2014).

[viii] Ibid.