Moldova Is the Next Front: Why the West Must Act Now to Secure Europe’s Most Vulnerable Democracy

Disclaimer: These opinion pieces represent the authors’ personal views and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of Norwich University or PAWC.

Moldova’s remarkable progress toward European integration will remain dangerously reversible unless the United States and the European Union adopt an immediate, unified strategy to secure its economy, fortify its democracy, and modernize its defense — because Russia has already positioned Moldova as the next front in its campaign against Ukraine. [1] The warning signs are not subtle. They are structural, historical, and increasingly operational. Moldova sits at the intersection of every pressure point Russia has exploited over the past decade: frozen conflicts, energy coercion, hybrid warfare, demographic vulnerability, and institutional fragility. [2] What distinguishes Moldova today is not its weakness but its momentum — and that is precisely what Moscow seeks to arrest. [3]

Moldova’s democratic transformation under pressure

For the first time since independence, Moldova has a government that is not merely pro-European in rhetoric but in action. [4] Under President Maia Sandu, the country has secured EU candidate status, opened accession negotiations, reformed its electoral code, strengthened the Central Election Commission, and passed a constitutional amendment enshrining EU membership as a national objective. [5] These are not symbolic gestures. They are the foundations of a democratic transformation that is already reshaping Moldova’s political culture and administrative capacity. Yet they remain embryonic, vulnerable to both internal polarization and external sabotage. The narrow margins of Sandu’s 2024 victory, the persistent influence of pro-Russian parties, and the Kremlin’s escalating disinformation campaigns all underscore how fragile this progress remains. [6]

Russia understands this fragility well. Its illegal troop presence in Transnistria — a Soviet-era relic Moscow refuses to relinquish — remains a direct challenge to Moldova’s sovereignty and a ready-made lever for destabilization. The war in Ukraine has only heightened the danger. Moscow’s attempts to seize a land bridge along Ukraine’s southern coast were not merely tactical; they were designed to place Russian forces within striking distance of Moldova’s eastern border. Even today, the Kremlin uses Transnistria’s energy infrastructure to pressure Chișinău, exploiting Moldova’s dependence on electricity generated in the breakaway region. Hybrid attacks, cyber intrusions, political manipulation, and the financing of extremist groups have intensified, mirroring the playbook Russia used in Ukraine before 2014 and again in 2022. [7]

A strengthening Western coalition

Yet Moldova is not standing still. Nor is it alone. The United States has quietly become one of its most consequential partners. Washington’s investments in Moldova’s energy independence — from supporting the Strășeni–Gutinaș power line to enabling Moldova’s first LNG imports from the United States — have reduced the country’s reliance on Russian gas for the first time in its modern history. The $15 million project to build a secure emergency communications network, along with the modernization of forensic and border control capacities, reflects a deeper recognition that Moldova’s internal resilience is a matter of regional security. These are not charity projects. They are strategic investments that blunt Russia’s ability to coerce a vulnerable state on NATO’s frontier. [8]

Europe, too, is awakening to Moldova’s importance. Romania has emerged as Chișinău’s most committed partner, not only politically but also administratively. The transfer of Romanian expertise in EU fund absorption — a chronic bottleneck for Moldova — is accelerating the country’s ability to implement European standards and modernize its infrastructure. Strategic twinning between Romanian and Moldovan municipalities is no longer symbolic; it is producing replicable models for healthcare modernization, digital governance, and transparent project management. President Nicușor Dan’s insistence that Moldova’s sovereignty and democratic will must guide the bilateral relationship reflects a mature partnership grounded in respect rather than paternalism. [9]

The Baltic states have also stepped forward, recognizing in Moldova the same vulnerabilities they once faced. The upcoming visit of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian parliamentary speakers to Chișinău is more than diplomatic choreography. It signals a shared understanding that Moldova’s success is integral to the security of Europe’s northeastern flank. These states — hardened by their own histories with Moscow — view Moldova not as a peripheral concern but as a frontline state whose fate will shape the continent’s trajectory. [10]

Perhaps most consequential, Poland has emerged as Moldova’s strategic bridge to Washington. With its strong economy, formidable military, and unique access to U.S. policymakers, Warsaw is well positioned to elevate Moldova’s security concerns — especially the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria — onto the broader Euro-Atlantic agenda. The new Polish-Moldovan defense partnership, focused on modernizing Moldova’s military education, training, and resilience, is a critical step toward building a defense sector capable of deterring hybrid threats and supporting Moldova’s democratic reforms. President Sandu’s recent visit to Warsaw, followed by her leadership role at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, underscores Moldova’s growing diplomatic stature at a moment when the region is seeking stability. [11]

What the West must do now

But momentum alone is not a strategy. Moldova’s vulnerabilities remain acute. Severe winter storms that recently paralyzed Chișinău exposed the fragility of local governance and the political friction that can impede crisis response. Chronic emigration continues to hollow out the workforce. Administrative capacity gaps slow the absorption of EU funds. The Trump administration’s abrupt shift toward transactional foreign policy has injected uncertainty into U.S. assistance programs, particularly those administered through USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Moldova cannot afford to have its future hinge on the volatility of Washington’s internal politics. [12]

This is why the United States and the European Union must act now, not reactively or incrementally, but strategically. Moldova needs a multidomain integration plan that accelerates its economic development, strengthens its democratic institutions, and modernizes its defense sector. It needs a Western strategy that treats Moldova not as a peripheral project but as a central pillar of Europe’s security architecture. It needs sustained engagement from Congress, civil society, and expert communities in Washington and Brussels to ensure that support does not evaporate with each electoral cycle. [13]

The alternative is clear. If the West hesitates, Russia will not. Moldova is the last unanchored democracy between the EU and a revanchist Russia. It is the most exposed state on Ukraine’s western flank. It is also the only place where Moscow still believes it can reverse the tide of European integration. The question is not whether Moldova matters. It is whether the United States and Europe will act quickly enough to protect a country that has chosen the West and is now risking everything for it. [14]

If Moldova falls, it will not fall alone. It will take with it the credibility of Europe’s enlargement policy, the stability of NATO’s eastern flank, and the hope for democratic transformation across the post-Soviet space. But if Moldova succeeds — if the West helps it succeed — it will mark the first time in a generation that a small, vulnerable state on Russia’s border has chosen democracy and won. [15]

That is a victory worth securing now, before the next front opens.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During his Marine Corps career, he deployed to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. His published works can be found in USNI’s Proceedings, Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[1] Stimson Center, “Memo: Moldova’s Strategic Vulnerabilities and Western Policy Options,” 2025.

[2] CIA World Factbook, “Moldova,” 2025.

[3] Radio Moldova, “Sandu Secures Polish Support to Negotiate Withdrawal of Illicit Russian Troops,” January 27, 2026.

[4] TRM, “President Nicușor Dan Backs Moldova’s EU Ambitions Amid Reunification Debates,” January 23, 2026.

[5] Radio Moldova, “PACE Winter Session: President Maia Sandu to Outline European Security Priorities,” January 23, 2026.

[6] Stimson Center, “Memo: Moldova’s Strategic Vulnerabilities and Western Policy Options,” 2025.

[7] Stimson Center, “Memo.”

[8] Stimson Center, “Memo.”

[9] TRM, “President Nicușor Dan Backs Moldova’s EU Ambitions Amid Reunification Debates,” January 23, 2026.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Radio Moldova, “PACE Winter Session: President Maia Sandu to Outline European Security Priorities,” January 23, 2026.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Stimson, “Memo”

[14] Radio Moldova, “PACE Winter Session: President Maia Sandu to Outline European Security Priorities,” January 23, 2026.

[15] Radio Moldova, “PACE Winter Session: President Maia Sandu to Outline European Security Priorities,” January 23, 2026.