

JPWWS

JOURNAL OF PEACE AND WAR STUDIES

Inaugural Issue, March 2019



NORWICH
UNIVERSITY®

The Peace and War Center, Norwich University, USA

The Journal of Peace and War Studies (JPWS) aims to promote and disseminate high quality research on peace and war throughout the international academic community. It also aims to provide policy makers in the United States and many other countries with in-depth analyses of contemporary issues and policy alternatives. JPWS encompasses a wide range of research topics covering peacekeeping/peacebuilding, interstate reconciliation, transitional justice, international security, human security, cyber security, weapons of mass destruction developments, terrorism, civil wars, religious/ethnic conflicts, and historical/territorial disputes around the world. JPWS is an annual peer-reviewed journal launched by the Peace and War Center (PAWC) at Norwich University—America's first private military college and birthplace of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC).

Editor Yangmo Ku

Associate Editors Steven Sodergren
Ali Askarov
Miri Kim
Michael Thunberg

Assistant Editor Michan Myer

Editorial Board Kenki Adachi, Ritsumeikan University, Japan
Felix Berenskoetter, University of London, England
Scott Crichlow, West Virginia University, USA
Clarissa Estep, West Virginia University, USA
Lily Gardner Feldman, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Linus Hagström, Swedish Defense University, Sweden
Youngjun Kim, Korea National Defense University, South Korea
Travis Morris, Norwich University, USA
Kristina Soukupova, Czech Technical University, Czech Republic
Lon Strauss, Marine Corps University, USA
Lasha Tchantouridzé, Norwich University, USA
Alexis Vahlas, University of Strasbourg, France
Jindong Yuan, University of Sydney, Australia

The opinions expressed in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Peace and War Center, Norwich University or the editors of the *Journal of Peace and War Studies*.

Copyright © 2019 by the Peace and War Center, Norwich University,
Printed by Norwich University Press.

ISSN 2641-841X(Print) • ISSN 2641-8428 (Online)

Aligning Autonomy and Alliance: Variation in South Korea's Policy Towards North Korea and the Moon Jae-in Presidency

Il Hyun Cho
Lafayette College

Abstract: Since its inception, the Moon Jae-in government has pursued a dual strategy of pressure and dialogue. This strategy reflects the contested nature of the North Korean threat in South Korea. While South Korea's conservatives consider the North to be a common enemy of the South Korea-US alliance, the progressive Moon government regards Pyongyang as an irksome but inevitable counterpart in its broader regional vision aimed at enhancing Seoul's foreign policy autonomy. This article seeks to go beyond existing studies that have been either fixated on the nuclear question or have framed South Korea's policy toward North Korea as a dichotomy between the conservative and progressive governments. By comparing various North Korea policies in the post-Cold War era, this article aims to explore the ideational and regional underpinnings of the Moon government's North Korean policy, examining its impact on the South Korea-US alliance and South Korea's relations with China, Russia, and Japan.

Keywords: *South Korea, North Korea, the United States, alliance, autonomy, threat perception, nationalism, regional order, East Asia*

Introduction

The Moon Jae-in government came to power in May 2017, replacing the impeached President Park Geun-hye and ending the rule of the two consecutive conservative governments in Seoul. The arrival of the progressive government coincided with the tumultuous year of escalating tensions between North Korea and the United States. By the second half of 2017, the tension reached a new height as North Korea's nuclear and missile tests sparked a fiery war of words between the Kim Jong-un regime and the Donald Trump administration. Sandwiched between the two, the Moon government responded to the unfolding crisis with a dual strategy of pressure and dialogue, with a strong emphasis on comprehensive engagement towards Pyongyang.

What are the main drivers of the Moon government's North Korea policy? What are its likely regional consequences? This article explores the ideational and regional underpinnings of the Moon government's engagement policy and examine its impact on the South Korea-

US alliance and South Korea's relations with China, Russia, and Japan. Existing studies have highlighted balancing, threat perception, or pan-Korean nationalism as factors shaping South Korea's policy towards North Korea.¹ While they may be useful in accounting for the approaches taken by some of the South Korean governments, they are insufficient to explain variation in North Korean policy throughout the post-Cold War era. For instance, in the face of North Korea's sinking of the South Korean naval ship *Cheonan* and attack on Yeonpyong Island, the conservative Lee Myung-bak government suspended various inter-Korean exchanges and strengthened the South Korea-US alliance. However, despite continuing provocations by North Korea and the intensifying tensions between the Kim regime and the Trump administration, the Moon government renewed exchanges with Pyongyang, which resulted in the three inter-Korean summits and two joint declarations aimed at promoting inter-Korean relations in 2018.²

Varied North Korean policies reflect the contested nature of the North Korean threat in South Korea. While South Korea's conservative politicians consider the North to be a common enemy and the *raison d'état* of the South Korea-US alliance, the progressive Moon government regards Pyongyang as an irksome but inevitable counterpart in its broader regional vision aimed at enhancing Seoul's foreign policy autonomy. With its focus on regional economic and energy cooperation centered on the Korean Peninsula, the Moon government has sought to balance its cooperation with the United States on the nuclear front and its efforts to improve inter-Korean relations. As a result, from a South Korean standpoint, coercive means such as maximum pressure or "bloody nose" strikes have the potential to undermine Seoul's larger regional roadmap. Instead, the Moon administration promotes both US-North Korean talks and inter-Korean relations in order to maintain South Korea's alliance ties with America and to expand its foreign policy autonomy.

This article first examines various theoretical perspectives with respect to South Korea's policy towards North Korea. In the subsequent sections, I compare different North Korea policies by various South Korean governments in the post-Cold War context and delve into President Moon's approach and specific policy measures. Finally, the article examines the broader regional implications of the Moon government's policy with respect to alliance ties and regional relationships.

Explaining Variation in South Korea's Policy Towards North Korea

A number of theoretical approaches are helpful in accounting for a range of policy choices made by different South Korean governments in the post-Cold War context. From a realist standpoint, when a nation threatens neighboring countries with military provocations, the expected policy response would be either internal balancing by increasing their military power or external balancing by seeking alliance partners to cope with the common threat.³ In response to North Korea's persistent threat in the form of nuclear weapons programs and numerous missile launches, several South Korean governments emphasized alliance ties with

the United States. However, not all administrations expanded their military capabilities or focused primarily on strengthening the South Korea-US alliance.

While the literature on balancing is useful in explaining various alliance behavior, it is important to note that states respond to a perceived threat, rather than the increased military capacity of other nations.⁴ Hence, we need to empirically examine the subjectivity of fear in balancing behavior.⁵ Not all countries respond uniformly to the same source of threat. This is because in the face of similar security challenges, the perceived levels of threat in a nation can vary substantially across different political actors as they have at times political motivations to heighten or downplay the threat from their neighbors. The question, then, is under what circumstances?

In accounting for different levels of threat perception, scholars have highlighted the importance of ideational factors.⁶ As for South Korea's threat perception vis-à-vis North Korea, the types of nationalism promoted by different South Korean governments are crucial. Specifically, the conservative governments led by Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye fostered "oppositional nationalism"⁷ centered on different political identities between the two Koreas (e.g., South Korea's identity as a democratic ally of the United States vs. a totalitarian rogue state identity of North Korea), which resulted in the depiction of North Korea as the primary enemy (or *joojeok*) of the South Korea-US alliance. Presidents Lee and Park consistently stressed the military threat emanating from Pyongyang, using it as an opportunity to promote oppositional nationalism and strengthen the alliance ties with the United States.

In contrast, the progressive governments led by Presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in promoted "pan-Korean nationalism" that focused less on different political identities between Seoul and Pyongyang than on common Korean national identities.⁸ From the standpoint of the progressive governments, North Korea is not a threat, but a crucial partner for a broader regional vision centered on the Korean Peninsula and Seoul's pursuit of greater autonomy in East Asia. The salience of regional autonomy in South Korea's foreign policymaking, in general, and its policy on North Korea, in particular, has been recognized by recent analyses.⁹ For instance, Scott Snyder shows how Seoul's foreign policy has been torn between its search for regional autonomy and its alliance relations with the United States, arguing that Seoul's best bet remains a credible alliance relationship with Washington.

It is worth noting, however, that one of the key drivers behind the progressive governments' push for foreign policy autonomy is South Korea's alliance ties with the United States. Located in a region surrounded by great powers and strategically reliant on the decades-long asymmetric security alliance with the United States, South Koreans have historically felt an acute sense of strategic dependence. As a result, a fervent desire to be an independent, more autonomous regional actor has persisted in South Korea.¹⁰ The yearning to take the lead in regional affairs is the strongest regarding issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula. President Roh's idea of South Korea's "balancer role" and President Moon's call for taking "the

driver's seat" in peninsula-related issues are a reflection of Seoul's autonomy-seeking strategy that taps into pan-Korean nationalism and downplays the North Korean threat.¹¹ This is why the Roh government did not suspend its engagement policy even after the revelation in 2002 that North Korea had been secretly pursuing a uranium-based nuclear program. As the Moon government stresses pan-Korean nationalism, it is also reportedly considering deletion of the term, "the main enemy (or *joojeok*)," from its 2018 National Defense White Paper.¹²

Overlooking variation in South Korea's autonomy-enhancing strategy and threat perceptions, existing analyses of the North Korean challenge have focused primarily on the resolution of the nuclear crisis. However, both the hardline approach by the Bush administration and the policy of "strategic patience" by the Obama administration have failed to halt Pyongyang's nuclear ambition. Instead, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, while making rapid progress in its missile capabilities. While President Trump held the historic summit with Kim Jong-un and opened a series of negotiations with Pyongyang, his government's main preoccupation has remained the elusive goal of achieving a "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling" (CVID) of nuclear programs in North Korea.

This article goes beyond existing studies that have been either fixated on the nuclear question or have framed South Korea's policy toward North Korea as a dichotomy between the conservative and progressive governments. For instance, while the progressive governments engaged Pyongyang, the conservative administrations have been depicted as "bas[ing] [their] policies on deep animosity toward North Korea and unfailing support for the US military alliance."¹³ This conservative vs. progressive frame is missing the variation within each camp, especially between the Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in governments, with respect to their North Korean policies and attendant regional strategies.

A key factor to consider is the types of autonomy-enhancing strategies taken by different progressive governments. In implementing their engagement policy toward North Korea, the progressive governments have to deal with another important external player, the United States. Specifically, the Roh government pursued a more exclusive form of autonomy focused on the Korean Peninsula, which was often in conflict with its alliance relations with the United States, as evidenced in Washington's concerns about South Korea's "balancer" role.¹⁴ However, the other progressive regimes sought an expansive form of autonomy (i.e., autonomy plus), closely coordinating their North Korean policies with their alliance relations with Washington. A prime example is the Kim Dae-jung government's policy on North Korea during the Clinton presidency, which culminated in the formation of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) and the 2000 US-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Joint Communiqué.¹⁵ The Moon government has been similarly committed to dovetailing its North Korean policy with its alliance relations with the United States. Overall, as shown in Table 1, varieties of South Korean policies towards North Korea are shaped in large part along the two conceptual domains: 1) the types of nationalism and the resulting threat perceptions of the ruling governments and 2) the types of autonomy-enhancing strategies and alliance relations.

Table 1. Variation in South Korean Policies Towards North Korea

		Types of Autonomy and Alliance Relations	
		Autonomy (often at odds with the United States)	Autonomy plus (autonomy and alliance) or alliance ties
Types of nationalism and threat perceptions	Pan-Korean nationalism (North Korea as a partner)	Roh Moo-hyun	Kim Dae-jung Moon Jae-in
	Oppositional nationalism (North Korea as a threat)	Kim Young-sam (1993-1994)	Lee Myung-bak Park Geun-hye

Variation in South Korea's policy on North Korea has regional implications because it affects alliance ties with the United States and South Korea's relations with its neighbors. When the conservative governments were in power, the alliance relationship remained strong, while South Korea's regional autonomy and independent policies toward other regional powers were somewhat curtailed. However, when the progressive governments ruled, the South Korea-US alliance occasionally faced setbacks, and South Korea's relations with other countries expanded. The strain on the alliance was most pronounced during the Roh presidency, as it pursued a regional autonomy strategy that was often at odds with Washington, a foreign policy mishap that President Moon has been striving to avoid by aligning South Korea's autonomy pursuit with its alliance ties with the United States. In the following sections, I first compare different priorities and policy approaches taken by various South Korean governments and then explore the current Moon Jae-in government's policy towards North Korea.

Varieties of South Korean Policy Towards North Korea

In the post-Cold War era, various governments in Seoul have adopted wide-ranging policies toward Pyongyang. The first democratically elected Kim Young-sam government initially promoted pan-Korean nationalism. Specifically, President Kim sought to improve relations with Pyongyang by declaring that “[n]o alliance can supersede our nation; neither ideology nor ideal can assure happiness as our nation can” and by sending back a North Korean prisoner who had been held in South Korea for several decades.¹⁶ However, the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-94 and Pyongyang's threat of turning South Korea into a sea of fire pushed the Kim Young-sam government into a hardline position and oppositional nationalism against the North. The conservative Kim government was thus largely sidelined

from the US-DPRK Agreed Framework that ended the first North Korean crisis in 1994.¹⁷

In 1998, the progressive Kim Dae-jung government first unveiled South Korea's engagement policy towards Pyongyang. President Kim's so-called "Sunshine Policy" consisted of the promise of not seeking unification through absorption by South Korea and socio-cultural exchanges including family visits and tourism in North Korea, all aimed at promoting pan-Korean nationalism. The policy culminated in the first-ever inter-Korean summit in June 2000. At the same time, however, the Kim administration had to work closely with the United States while handling the Asian Financial Crisis that engulfed the South Korean economy, as well as alliance cooperation during the 1998 North Korean missile crisis that led to the Perry Process of negotiation with Pyongyang.¹⁸ During this period, the South Korean government closely coordinated its policy on North Korea with the United States and Japan through the TCOG.

The TCOG was a novel and interactive pattern of trilateral alliance coordination among the US, Japan, and South Korea, going beyond the traditional mechanism of policy coordination through the United States as the hub of the US-Japan and the US-South Korea alliances.¹⁹ Through numerous meetings at the senior and ministerial levels and a trilateral summit, the Perry Process not only effectively coordinated the three countries' North Korea policies, but also strengthened alliance relationships along the way. While the sunshine policy was criticized by the conservatives in South Korea as "*Bookhan Peojugi*" (or spoiling the North with unconditional economic support), President Kim's engagement policy was a prime example of South Korea's leadership role in peninsula affairs with largely positive regional outcomes, including expanded regional autonomy for Seoul and a stronger alliance relationship with Washington.

Kim's successor and another progressive leader, President Roh Moo-hyun, continued with the engagement policy, but under the context of a rapidly developing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. By the time the second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2002, the George W. Bush administration had approached the nuclear provocation with a whole new level of urgency and determination in the post-9/11 context.²⁰ The resulting pronouncement of "the axis of evils" and the policy of counterproliferation left little room for South Korea's engagement policy towards Pyongyang. In an effort to garner US support for its North Korean policy, however, the Roh administration agreed to send South Korean troops to Iraq, prompting protests from his own party members.

Building on the engagement policy of the Kim Dae-jung government and furthering pan-Korean nationalism, the Roh government intensified interactions with North Korea. Specifically, the Roh government expanded economic and humanitarian aids to North Korea. For instance, it provided \$111.78 million for humanitarian assistance through international organizations, a substantial increase from the Kim Dae-jung government's offer of \$55.38 million.²¹ In 2004, the Roh government also established the Kaesung Joint Industrial Complex, which involved more than 120 South Korean companies.²² It also pursued South Korea's

greater autonomy by seeking a “balancer role” in the region and raising questions about alliance relations with the United States. The search of more exclusive regional autonomy did not make progress as the hardline policy of the Bush administration and North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) provocations increased tension, leading to North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006. As a sign of his insistence on regional autonomy, however, President Roh made one last push for the engagement policy by holding the second inter-Korean summit in 2007.

In 2008, the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration came to power with a major policy reversal towards Pyongyang. With its critical assessment of the engagement policy of the progressive Kim and Roh governments, President Lee rejected previous declarations from the first and second inter-Korean summits.²³ As a former CEO of a major construction company, President Lee adopted a practical approach centered on reciprocal cooperation with Pyongyang. Its “Denuclearization-Opening-3000” strategy was aimed at helping Pyongyang achieve the per capita GDP of 3,000 dollars within ten years in exchange for its denuclearization and economic opening.²⁴

With these broad goals in mind, President Lee in 2009 proposed a “Grand Bargain,” a compressive package deal in which members of the Six Party talks would simultaneously pursue North Korea’s complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear programs and reciprocal measures by the members of the Six Party talks (e.g., security guarantee, diplomatic normalization and economic support). In an effort to promote international, rather than inter-Korean, coordination, the Lee government asserted that specific implementation plans would be determined by the five members of the Six Party talks, namely, South Korea, the US, China, Japan, and Russia.²⁵

Breaking away from the previous governments’ emphasis on pan-Korean nationalism and greater regional autonomy, President Lee stressed cooperation with the international community in economic support for North Korea as well. In particular, the Lee government made a particular emphasis on the improvement of the alliance relationship with Washington. From its standpoint, the enhanced alliance ties would promote North Korea’s relations with the United States, which would in turn benefit inter-Korean relations.²⁶ After the sinking of *Cheonan*, the Lee government announced a series of coercive measures against North Korea, including the May 24 measures banning all inter-Korean exchanges except for the Kaesung industrial complex.²⁷

Echoing the US stance, Lee’s priority throughout his presidency remained the denuclearization of North Korea. For instance, Lee’s Unification Minister Hyun In-taek stressed the importance of achieving denuclearization as a prerequisite for further inter-Korean exchanges:

I will implement President Lee’s philosophy of national governance in our policy on North Korea and unification. And denuclearization of North Korea will continue to serve as a precondition for the comprehensive development of inter-Korean relations.²⁸

However, South Korean analysts criticized Lee's North Korean policy because it left little room for South Korea's autonomy in regional issues. As one South Korean analyst observed, the Lee government internationalized the peninsula question, and as a result, the inter-Korean issue was subordinated to US-South Korean relations.²⁹ The Lee administration's hardline policy and the May 24 measures also enabled North Korea's increasing "dependence on China" as the latter's share of North Korea's trade jumped from 24.8 percent in 2000 to 88.1 percent in 2010.³⁰

Park Geun-hye, Lee's successor as president, followed a similar policy towards Pyongyang, although she used catch phrases such as "Trustpolitik" and "unification as *daebak* (or a bonanza)." Trustpolitik is premised on the assumptions that the root of inter-Korean tensions is a lack of trust between the two nations and that South Korea's unconditional economic support for the North is not beneficial for regaining trust between them. The South Korean public initially expressed their support for this new approach as she sought to gradually improve relations with North Korea through humanitarian aid.³¹

Despite her call for patience and trust building in Seoul's relations with Pyongyang, President Park brought up the question of unification as well. In her first New Year's remark in January 2014, she asserted that unification could serve as a major opportunity for South Korea to stimulate the economy (hence the term, a bonanza).³² In a nod to President Lee's North Korean policy, however, the Park government also sought to resolve the nuclear challenge first, while stressing international cooperation and humanitarian aid to North Korea.³³ Specifically, she argued that South Korea should "mobilize the international community to help it dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear program," especially "strengthening the indispensable alliance between South Korea and the United States."³⁴ Overall, the national identity the Park government promoted was an international one that confronted or excluded North Korea.³⁵ The end result was the continuation of oppositional nationalism and the heightened threat perception vis-à-vis North Korea.

As one South Korean analyst pointed out, however, it was premature to discuss unification when there was no progress in inter-Korean relations, a first step toward the goal of achieving unification.³⁶ Ironically, Park's own minister in charge of unification Ryu Giljae later revealed that he was not even informed of Park's speech on unification.³⁷ The Park government also established a Unification Preparation Committee, but as a South Korean analyst observed, without short and immediate-term plans to improve inter-Korean relations, the talk of unification and trustpolitik went nowhere.³⁸ She also presented the so-called Dresden Declaration, laying out "three proposals to North Korean authorities in the hope of laying the groundwork for peaceful unification."³⁹ But the speech was viewed as potentially provocative to the Kim Jong-un regime because it could mean unification through absorption by the South.⁴⁰

The Moon Jae-in Government's North Korea Policy

Coming on the heels of the first-ever impeachment of a South Korean president, the Moon Jae-in government adopted a radically different approach towards Pyongyang. Having served as the Chief of Staff for President Roh Moo-hyun and having accompanied Roh during his summit with Kim Jong-il in October 2007, President Moon was expected to continue the engagement policy and the autonomy pursuit of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. Even prior to assuming his presidency, Moon promised to take the lead in addressing the North Korea challenge.⁴¹ In an extensive interview, Moon, then the leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Korea, observed that Korea's national tragedy of losing sovereignty to Japan came about as the Korean Peninsula turned into a battleground for great power competition.⁴² It is thus crucial for South Korea to carve out its own space and autonomous role in the region.

Despite similar focus on pan-Korean nationalism and South Korea's leading role in the peninsula affairs, however, President Moon sought to overcome Roh's shortcomings. For instance, former US Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard criticized Roh's North Korean policy as fixated on inter-Korean relations to a point where it jeopardized alliance ties with Washington.⁴³ As such, Moon has been careful not to alienate the US in his search for South Korea's regional autonomy and, whenever possible, made sure to coordinate South Korea's policy with that of Washington. For instance, South Korean Ambassador to the United States, Cho Yoon-je, reiterated, in October 2018, the importance of coordinating inter-Korean relations with the alliance ties:

The inter-Korean summit in April served as a springboard for the first North Korea-US summit, and the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in September breathed new life into North Korea-US dialogue. The two tracks of inter-Korean relations and denuclearization provide each other with momentum and enable us to keep moving forward.⁴⁴

At the same time, the Moon government engages North Korea as part of a broader regional vision that goes beyond Northeast Asia. In contrast to President Roh's unsuccessful efforts for South Korea's "balancer" role in Northeast Asia, President Moon has been seeking to strengthen alliance ties with the United States, while pursuing more expansive regional autonomy by reaching out to other Asian nations.⁴⁵

Despite his renewed emphasis on the relations with the United States, however, it is important to note that there are fundamental differences between the US administrations and the Moon government in their views of coercion and sanctions. The successive US administrations have tended to utilize a coercive approach to pressure Pyongyang into nuclear dismantlement, whereas the Moon government views sanctions as a means to bring North Korean to the negotiating table. As such, the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" strategy and the "bloody nose" tactic of targeted military strikes on North Korea stood in contrast to the Moon government's dual strategy of pressure and dialogue.

Overall, President Moon opposed the policy of isolating the Kim regime and expressed his willingness to engage North Korea with the larger goals of denuclearizing Pyongyang and establishing a permanent peace system on the Korean Peninsula.⁴⁶ During the tense war of words between Kim Jong-un and Trump in August 2017, President Moon questioned the validity of using only coercive means and stated that “[t]he purpose of strong sanctions and pressure against North Korea is to bring it to the negotiating table, not to raise military tensions.”⁴⁷ Even weeks after Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test, Moon, in his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2017, focused more on multilateral negotiation than on sanctions on North Korea.⁴⁸

As for specific policy measures, the Moon government from the first month of its rule took a 180-degree turn by permitting humanitarian missions to North Korea such as medical support and religious exchanges.⁴⁹ In July 2017, President Moon laid out a “New Economic Map for the Korean Peninsula” and called for meetings with North Korea to discuss various inter-Korean issues. In contrast to the conservative Lee and Park administrations’ insistence on the denuclearization as a precondition for dialogue, the Moon government is of the view that to denuclearize, South Korea needs to engage North Korea and improve inter-Korean relations first. This conviction is evidenced in Moon’s memoir, in which he writes that it would be crucial to restore bilateral relations with North Korea and help it get out of isolation, which would also help resolve the nuclear crisis.⁵⁰

The Moon government’s different assumption about North Korea applies to the issues of unification and economic cooperation as well. In September 2017, President Moon assured Pyongyang that his government did not “desire the collapse of North Korea” and “[would] not seek unification by absorption or artificial means.”⁵¹ In fact, Moon believes that peaceful relations with North Korea could be the basis of a new economic opportunity linking the Korean Peninsula to China and Russia, especially for the next generation of Koreans.⁵² Moon also maintains that the Lee and Park governments ended positive economic cooperation between the two Koreas, forcing North Korea to rely on China, and that a China-friendly regime in Pyongyang would make reunification far more difficult.⁵³

As for a broader regional roadmap, the New Economic Map for the Korean Peninsula initiative plans to develop the three belts that connect the two Koreas with the larger aims of securing a new economic engine for the peninsula and linking economies in Northeast Asia: 1) the East Coast belt for energy and natural resources linking the two Koreas to Russia; 2) the West Coast belt for industrial, logistics, and transportation sectors connecting Seoul, the Kaesung industrial complex, and Pyongyang; and 3) the demilitarized zone (DMZ) belt for the environment and tourism linking Mounts Seorak, Keumkang, and Baekdu. This regional master plan aims to create the environment for unification by facilitating inter-Korean cooperation, job creation, and economic growth. Overall, it seeks to build a Northeast Asian economic community and transform the Korean Peninsula into a regional hub of economic cooperation.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the conservative Liberty Korea Party continues to highlight denuclearization and alliance relations with the United States. Commenting on the overall direction of President Moon's North Korean policy, Hyun In-taek, former Unification Minister during the Lee Myung-bak presidency, called for closer cooperation with the United States, rather than following North Korea's demands.⁵⁵ Hong Joon-pyo, then the leader of the Liberty Korea Party, also criticized President Moon's lack of a blueprint for North Korea's denuclearization and reiterated the Party's demand for reinstating tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.⁵⁶ A spokesperson for the Liberty Korea Party went even further to demand a "free North Korea" policy that could facilitate a collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime.⁵⁷

However, the conservative position has not been popular among the South Korean public. While many South Koreans were frustrated about North Korea's military provocations in 2017, the majority of the South Korean public continue to praise Moon's sustained efforts for dialogue and accuse the conservatives of being fixated on the Cold War-type anti-North Korean sentiment.⁵⁸ Even before President Moon's summit with Kim Jong-un, more than 70 percent of South Koreans expressed their support for the summit.⁵⁹ In the wake of Moon's consistent engagement policy towards Pyongyang and his two successful summits with Kim Jong-un, his approval rating shot to 83 percent, the highest ever for a first-year South Korean president.⁶⁰

Against this domestic political backdrop, Moon's Democratic Party won a landslide victory in local elections in June 2018, winning 14 out of 17 Metropolitan Mayor/Governor positions.⁶¹ Given the overall support for Moon's policy towards North Korea, South Korea's conservatives need to "think of a way to reach out to young voters," which would be much more difficult in light of the revelation that "South Korea's military had drawn up plans for martial law during the mostly youth-led anti-Park protests."⁶²

At the regional level, criticizing the Lee Myung-bak government's failure to improve relations with other countries in the region, President Moon argues for balanced diplomacy in which South Korea maintains its alliance relations with Washington, while maintaining cooperation with China.⁶³ Moon's efforts for greater regional linkages including the alliance is evidenced in the Panmunjeom Declaration signed at the first summit between Moon and Kim. In view of the Trump administration's focus on denuclearization, both sides agreed to work towards "complete denuclearization" of the Korean Peninsula.⁶⁴ But they dedicated most of the document in promoting inter-Korean relations. Moon and Kim also "agreed to actively pursue trilateral meetings involving the two Koreas and the United States, or quadrilateral meetings involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China with a view to declaring an end to the war, turning the armistice into a peace treaty, and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime."⁶⁵

Overall, the Moon government stresses the importance of South Korea's leadership role and pan-Korean nationalism, even in dealing with the nuclear question. This stands in contrast to the conservative governments which prioritized cooperation with the international community, especially the United States, over inter-Korean relations. In a nationally-televised

speech in August 2018, President Moon thus declared, “we are the protagonists in Korean Peninsula-related issues” and “advancement in inter-Korean relations is the driving force behind denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”⁶⁶ The following month, in September 2018, Moon held his third summit with Kim Jong-un. At the conclusion of the summit, both sides issued the Pyongyang Declaration, in which they “reaffirmed the principle of independence and self-determination of the Korean nation, and agreed to consistently and continuously develop inter-Korean relations,” while pledging their cooperation on “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”⁶⁷

Regional Consequences

The Moon government’s North Korea policy has larger implications for the US alliances in East Asia and South Korea’s relations with China, Russia, Japan, and Southeast Asians. Similar to the Kim and Roh governments, President Moon approaches the North Korean question not just as the nuclear challenge but also part of inter-Korean relations and the regional security order in East Asia. This viewpoint is premised on the assumption that the resolution of the nuclear crisis is inextricably linked to the larger regional order. As such, how the North Korean challenge is addressed has the potential to reshape alliance dynamics and regionalism in East Asia.⁶⁸ However, in contrast to the previous progressive governments that promoted regional cooperation confined to Northeast Asia, the Moon administration calls for much wider regional linkages that include Russia and Southeast Asian nations, while at the same time reaffirming the alliance ties with the United States.

As for the alliance, Moon’s North Korea policy is aimed at enhancing South Korea’s autonomy by taking the lead in peninsula matters, but with the understanding that this should not come at the expense of alliance relations. During the Roh presidency, the proposed balancer role was widely criticized by South Korean conservatives who viewed such a role as “impractical” and blamed Roh for “weakening the country’s traditional alliance with the United States and Japan in favor of a neutral position among regional powers.”⁶⁹ Unlike Roh, President Moon has ensured that his foreign policy team coordinated closely with the Trump administration over the North Korean question, even as his government reached out to Pyongyang for dialogue. His dual strategy of pressure and dialogue towards North Korea itself is a reflection of his efforts to coordinate with the US on the nuclear front, while charting South Korea’s own path to North Korea.

His strategy was tested early on in 2017 as the tension intensified between North Korea and the United States. Despite Moon’s emphasis on the alliance relations with Washington, President Trump’s message of “fire and fury” on North Korea and the Trump administration’s consideration of limited strikes on North Korea worried the Moon government. In fact, a Pentagon official warned that the bloody nose strike could lead to “an unacceptably high number of casualties.”⁷⁰ Therefore, according to an American analyst, a key task for the Trump administration was “to up the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign and keep South Korea

on board.”⁷¹ However, during his meeting with US Vice President Mike Pence, Moon still expressed his desire to seek dialogue with North Korea, although Pence reiterated CVID as the most important priority.⁷²

After the inter-Korean summit in April 2018, South Korea’s efforts to promote dialogue between the US and North Korea facilitated the first-ever summit between a sitting US president and a North Korean leader. Ironically, despite Moon’s efforts to ensure the alliance ties, during the news conference after his summit with Kim, Trump called US-South Korean military drills “provocative” and expressed his willingness to withdraw US forces from South Korea.⁷³ In response, a Defense Ministry spokesperson in South Korea said, “there is a need to discern the exact meaning and intent of President Trump’s comments,” mentioning that “there have been no discussions yet with Washington on modifying drills set for August.”⁷⁴ This confusing alliance dynamic is problematic as Moon has consistently sought to coordinate with Washington and the South Korean public still remains supportive of the alliance with the United States.⁷⁵

As for China, which has been alarmed by North Korea’s provocations and the mounting tension between Pyongyang and Washington, the Moon government’s policy of engagement came as a welcome development on the peninsula. While China remains the only military alliance partner for North Korea and provides most of the latter’s oil and other necessary supplies, China has recently joined the other members of the UN Security Council to place a series of sanctions against North Korea on minerals, jet fuels, and even a complete ban on its coal and iron exports.⁷⁶

Beijing’s hardline approach to Pyongyang stems from its increasing concerns about the negative regional repercussions of North Korea’s WMD provocations. Coupled with its potential to spark a nuclear arms race in an already volatile region filled with political tensions and territorial disputes, Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship has served to bolster America’s military presence in East Asia. As a result, the Chinese government pushed for a “dual-track approach” aimed at seeking the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and establishing a permanent peace system in the region.⁷⁷

In this regard, President Moon’s engagement policy towards Pyongyang and the Panmunjeom Declaration calling for a permanent peace treaty were particularly beneficial for China. As a participant in the Korean War, officially ending the Korean War has been a key priority for Beijing. In fact, South Korean progressives, such as former Unification Minister Lee Jongsuk, call for speedy declaration of the end of the Korean War and the start of the permanent peace process.⁷⁸ However, the conservatives oppose such a declaration without North Korea’s complete denuclearization, sticking to the US position.⁷⁹ Interestingly, it was reported in the South Korean media that Yang Jiechi, Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and former Chinese Foreign Minister, had made a secret visit to South Korea around mid-July of 2018 to discuss the ending of the Korean War with South Korean officials.⁸⁰ In a sign of growing cooperation between South Korea and China, the South

Korean ambassador to Beijing also stated that South Korea and China would continue their strategic communication for Beijing's constructive role in the Korean Peninsula.⁸¹

China-North Korea bilateral relations improved significantly after the three summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un. The third meeting came one week after the Kim-Trump summit in Singapore. In a sign of growing ties between the two communist nations, the Chinese government "broke with precedent and announced Kim's two-day visit."⁸² As the positive momentum continued over the summer of 2018, the Chinese government appeared to have relaxed its sanctions against Pyongyang, as North Korean workers were reportedly "returning to jobs inside China, some under the guise of educational exchanges."⁸³ President Xi also sent Li Zhanshu, the Chairman of the National People's Congress and the third highest member of the Chinese Communist Party, as his special envoy to Pyongyang as the Kim regime commemorated the 70th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK.⁸⁴ In his letter delivered to Kim, President Xi declared that the two communist nations "through the three past summits with Kim, opened a new chapter in the development of bilateral relations," expressing his hope to "develop North Korea-China relations more quickly."⁸⁵ The Chinese government also urged the UN Security Council to consider immediate sanction relief on North Korea "in accordance with the compliance of [North Korea] and the development of the situation."⁸⁶

However, the Moon government's push for dialogue was not well received in Tokyo. After numerous North Korean missile launches, some of them flying directly over Japan, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo at the UN General Assembly declared that Japan "will face up to North Korea's nuclear and missile threat through the Japan-US Alliance and through Japan, the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) acting in unity," while supporting the US position that "all options are on the table" and UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea.⁸⁷ As long as the Abe government maintains its hardline position on North Korea, Moon's engagement policy towards North Korea may raise questions over effective coordination between South Korea and Japan.

Going beyond President Roh's regional strategy centered on Northeast Asia, President Moon has expanded South Korea's regional role to include Russia and Southeast Asia. The new strategic shift is evidenced in South Korea's Northern and Southern strategies. As for Russia, Moon's speech at the 2017 Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok shows that South Korea's new northern policy is aimed at linking East Asia via economic and energy cooperation.⁸⁸ In this broader regional vision, enhanced inter-Korean relations are crucial as one of the key linkages in the plan is gas pipelines through North Korea. To this end, the Moon administration established the Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation. President Moon also suggested a Northeast Asian supergrid that would connect Russia, Mongolia, and the two Koreas as part of a larger regional vision for economic community and multilateral security regime in East Asia.⁸⁹ During his state visit to Russia in June 2018, Moon reiterated the importance of South Korean-Russian economic cooperation and trilateral cooperation among North and South Korea and Russia.⁹⁰ As a specific mechanism

for regional cooperation, President Moon also proposed an East Asian Railway Community linking six Northeast Asian nations and the United States as a stepping stone for regional energy and economic communities such as the European Union.⁹¹

South Korea's latest efforts to expand its regional autonomy is its "Southern Policy" that "seeks to diversify and enhance Seoul's political and economic relations with ASEAN's 10-member states, as well as India."⁹² During his July 2018 meetings with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Moon depicted "a peaceful Korean Peninsula as a 'new economic growth engine' for ASEAN countries."⁹³ North Korea's participation in the 2018 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) further promoted Moon's expanded regional vision linked to North Korea.⁹⁴

Conclusion

The Moon Jae-in government's policy towards North Korea is driven by its efforts to reshape the nature of inter-Korean relations and expand South Korea's regional autonomy. Unlike the previous progressive governments' approaches, Moon's policy has expanded the scope of regional strategy from Northeast Asia to greater Asia, including Russia and Southeast Asia. By comparing the Moon administration's policy with those of previous South Korean governments, this article has argued that President Moon's North Korea policy has thus far aligned South Korea's engagement of Pyongyang with its alliance relationship with Washington in an effective manner.

As the Moon government seeks to promote regional cooperation and denuclearization on the basis of stable inter-Korean relations, the Trump administration should approach the North Korean challenge not merely as a proliferation challenge but also as a novel way to establish a new regional order. In this regard, Mike Mullen and Sam Nunn's proposal of "a comprehensive deal" involving the US, the two Koreas, and China is a viable option. In the proposal, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former senator recommend that all sides work to replace the armistice on the peninsula with "a peace agreement" in return for North Korea's pledge of nuclear disarmament and progress on other issues.⁹⁵

However, the issues of sequencing and verification will remain major hurdles, but a larger implication of the proposal is that resolution of the nuclear crisis has the potential to influence other salient regional issues, ranging from the role of US troops in South Korea to the signing of a permanent peace treaty, and eventually to the unification of the two Koreas. It is not far from what the Moon government has called for. However, South Korea's engagement policy and broader regional strategy need to proceed in close partnership with the United States. In this vein, at the G-20 summit in November 2018, President Moon agreed with President Trump "on the importance of maintaining vigorous enforcement of existing sanctions to ensure the DPRK understands that

denuclearization is the only path to economic prosperity and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.”⁹⁶

Moreover, overall regional dynamics surrounding North Korea are often far beyond the control of South Korea. In early November 2018, for instance, North Korea’s foreign ministry threatened to “return to a policy of strengthening its nuclear force if the Trump administration did not lift economic sanctions,” and a scheduled meeting between US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his North Korean negotiating partner Kim Young-choI was cancelled at the last minute.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the Moon government has been relentless in its engagement of North Korea in large part to catalyze the denuclearization of North Korea, which would then allow sanction relief and resumption of inter-Korean economic projects.⁹⁸ Although the end game on the peninsula is far from clear at this writing, the Moon administration will continue to promote both inter-Korean relations and US-North Korean talks as part of its broader foreign policy vision of seeking greater regional autonomy while sustaining Seoul’s alliance ties with Washington.

Il Hyun Cho (Ph.D., Cornell University) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Law and the Asian Studies Program at Lafayette College. His research interests include global governance, security studies, nuclear proliferation, regionalism, energy/environmental politics, and East Asian politics. He has held research fellowships and visiting positions at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; the Department of Political Science, Stanford University; the Institute of Social Sciences, the University of Tokyo; the Academy of Korean Studies; the Center for the Study of the Presidency; and the Center for International Studies, Yonsei University. He is the author of Global Rogues and Regional Orders: The Multidimensional Challenge of North Korea and Iran (Oxford University Press, 2016). His research has also been published in Review of International Studies, Global Governance, Foreign Policy Analysis, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Washington Post, The Diplomat, Asian Security, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Korean Journal of Defense Analyses, and other edited volumes.

Notes

1. Pastreich, Emanuel. "The Balancer: Roh Moo-hyun's Vision of Korean Politics and the Future of Northeast Asia," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, August 1, 2005; Kim, Jiyul. "Pan-Korean Nationalism, Anti-Great Power-ism and U.S.-South Korean Relations," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 3: 12, December 12, 2005; Snyder, Scott. *South Korea at the Crossroads: Alliance and Autonomy in an Era of Rival Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.
2. "Full Text of Panmunjeom Declaration," *Korea Times*, April 27, 2018. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/04/731_248077.html; "[Full Text] Pyongyang Declaration," *Korea Times*, September 19, 2018. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/09/103_255848.html.
3. Snyder, Glenn H. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997; Cha, Victor D. *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States–Korea–Japan Security Triangle*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
4. Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.
5. Similarly, Ted Hopf suggests that Walt's balance of threat argument demands "a theory of threat perception." See Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23: 1 (Summer 1998): 186-187.
6. Along with Hopf, Peter Katzenstein also observes that Walt's focus on threat perception allowed for a shift in "analysis from material capabilities to ideational factors," especially the role of ideology as a key variable in shaping threat perceptions. See Katzenstein, Peter J. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 27-28.
7. Jacques Hymans defines oppositional nationalism as "being both naturally at odds with and naturally equal (if not superior) to a particular external other." See Hymans, Jacques E. C. *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 13.
8. Jiyul Kim defines pan-Korean nationalism as "the sense of Korean nationalism...that embraces north and south." Kim, "Pan-Korean Nationalism, Anti-Great Power-ism and U.S.-South Korean Relations."
9. Snyder, *South Korea at the Crossroads*; Cho, Il Hyun. *Global Rogues and Regional Orders: The Multidimensional Challenge of North Korea and Iran*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016; Cho, Il Hyun and Seo-Hyun Park. "Domestic Legitimacy Politics and Varieties of Regionalism in East Asia," *Review of International Studies* 40: 3 (July 2014): 583-606.
10. For a discussion on the impact of South Korea's autonomy pursuit on its response to the U.S. troop levels, see Cho, Il Hyun. "Downsizing Hegemony: Alliance, Domestic Politics, and American Retrenchment in East Asia, 1969–2017," *Asian Security* 14: 3 (2018): 246-262. For an analysis of the role of regional autonomy in shaping the types of East Asian regionalism, see Cho and Park. "Domestic Legitimacy Politics and Varieties of Regionalism."

11. Pastreich, "The Balancer"; Bae, Hyun-jung. "Full text of Moon's speech at the Korber Foundation," *Korea Herald*, July 7, 2017. <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170707000032>.
12. Byun, Jihee. "The Military Is Considering Deletion of the Phrase "North Korean Military Is Our Energy,"" *Chosun Ilbo*, August 22, 2018. [in Korean] http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/08/22/2018082201011.html.
13. Taylor, Adam. "For South Korean conservatives, Trump adds to deep political problems," *Washington Post*, July 15, 2018.
14. Pastreich, "The Balancer."
15. Cho, *Global Rogues and Regional Orders*, pp. 83-88.
16. *Chosun Ilbo*, February 26, 1993, quoted in Yoon, Sanghyun. "South Korea's Kim Young Sam Government: Political Agendas," *Asian Survey* 36: 5 (May 1996): 513.
17. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control. *Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, October 21, 1994. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htm>.
18. "The North Korean Policy Review: What Happened in 1999," The William J. Perry Project, August 11, 2017. <http://www.wjperryproject.org/notes-from-the-brink/the-north-korean-policy-review-what-happened-in-1999>.
19. Cho, *Global Rogues and Regional Orders*, pp. 90-91.
20. Ellis, Jason D. "The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and US National Security," *The Washington Quarterly* 26: 2 (Spring 2003): 115-133.
21. *Joongang Ilbo*, September 19, 2017. <https://news.joins.com/article/21947940>.
22. "What is the Kaesong Industrial Complex?" *BBC*, February 10, 2016. <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-22011178>.
23. Park, Sangik. "Assessment of the Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korea Policy and the Direction of the New Government North Korea Policy," *Military Development Research* (2012): 249. [in Korean]
24. "Denuclearization-Opening-3000," Ministry of National Unification, South Korea <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/terviewKnwldgDicarydo?pageIndex=11&dicaryId=89&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=>.
25. "Grand Bargain [Comprehensive Package Deal]," Ministry of National Unification, South Korea. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewKnwldgDicarydo?pageIndex=2&dicaryId=180&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=>.

26. “The Lee Myung-bak Government’s ‘Denuclearization-Opening-3000’ Initiative: Its Strategy and Roadmap,” *Monthly Chosun*, April 2008. [in Korean] <http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=200804100016>.
27. Park, “Lee Myung-bak Jeongbu,” p. 251.
28. Ministry of Unification, 2009, cited in Moon, Chung-in. “Between Principle and Pragmatism: What Went Wrong with the Lee Myung-bak Government’s North Korean Policy?” *Journal of International and Area Studies* 18: 2 (2011): 5.
29. Kwon, Hyukcheol. “Denuclearization-Opening-3000 Is Bogus,’ Critical Views Abound,” *Hankyoreh*, February 12, 2008. [in Korean] <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/269139.html#csidx8a09fa22d9685db9f3fa11cb0535da7>.
30. Moon, “Between Principle and Pragmatism,” p. 11.
31. Gil, Yoonhyung. “The Park Geun-hye Government’s North Korea Policy Is Good, 76%,” *Hankyoreh*, June 23, 2013. [in Korean] http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/592894.html#csidx18af7744dc9cf48b5a06c0f6c5d7f3c.
32. Park, Sungwoo. “President Park Geun-hye’s Press Conference ‘Unification is a Bonanza,’” *Radio Free Asia*, January 6, 2014. [in Korean] https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/pressmeeting-01062014091331.html.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Park, Geun-hye. “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 5 (September/October 2011): 13-18.
35. Paik, Haksoon. “The Park Geun-hye Government’s North Korea and Unification Policies,” *Sejong Policy Series* (May 2018).
36. Interview with Dr. Paik Haksoon, cited in Kang, Soohwan. “From the Sunshine Policy to ‘Unification as a Bonanza,’ Changes in North Korea Policy,” *Korea University News*, May 18, 2015. [in Korean] <http://www.kunews.ac.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=21730>.
37. Chung, Inhwan. “Former Unification Minister Ryu Giljae Had No Clues About the Speech, ‘Unification Is a Bonanza,’” *Hankyoreh*, February 9, 2017. [in Korean] <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/782095html#csidxfd294c8deb7922a81fcbf6e2d674e74>.
38. Hong, Hyun-ik. “Unification as a Bonanza and the Objectives of the Unification Preparation Committee,” *Political Trends and Policy* 223 (October 2014): 3. [in Korean]
39. Full text of President Park Geun-hye’s speech in Dresden, Germany, *Korea Times*, March 28, 2014. <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140328001400>.

40. “Assessment of the Dresden Declaration and Its Policy Direction,” *Sejong PolicyForum*, April 14, 2014. [in Korean] http://www.sejong.org/board/bd_news/1/egoread.php?bd=5&itm=&txt=&pg=6&seq=945
41. Fifield, Anna. “Trump asked Moon to give him public credit for pressuring North Korea into talks,” *Washington Post*, January 20, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/trump-asked-moon-to-give-him-public-credit-for-pressuring-north-korea-into-talks/2018/01/20/8110e20a-fc55-11e7-b832-8c26844b74fb_story.html?utm_term=.197c9a11e696
42. Moon, Jae-in. *South Korea Asks*. Paju: 21 Century books, 2017, p. 191. [in Korean]
43. Interview with former US Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard, *Donga Ilbo*, March 8, 2018. <http://news.donga.com/Main/3/all/20180308/89001670/1#csidx44a1a035de4cdfbb4512ec003e3c021>.
44. “ROK ambassador to US says inter-Korean relations and denuclearization move at different speeds,” *Hankyoreh*, October 18, 2018, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/866409.html. It is worth noting that the South Korean ambassador’s speech came in the same week when U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Harry Harris remarked that Seoul’s inter-Korean policy “must be linked” with the goal of denuclearization.” See “Harris warns Seoul on too much engagement,” *JoongAng Daily*, October 18, 2018. <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3054390>.
45. Cho, Il Hyun and Seo-Hyun Park. “South Korea has reason to be skeptical — and optimistic — about dialogue with North Korea,” *Washington Post*, May 16, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/16/south-korea-has-reason-to-be-both-skeptical-and-optimistic-about-dialogue-with-north-korea/?utm_term=.551971984ba4.
46. No, Hyodong, Sangheon Lee, and Seungwook Kim. “President Moon’s “Berlin Plan”: Building New Economy on a Permanent Peace System,” *Yonhap News*, July 6, 2017. [in Korean] <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2017/07/06/0200000000AKR20170706191551001.HTML>.
47. Choe, Sang-Hun. “South Korea’s Leader Bluntly Warns U.S. Against Striking North,” *New York Times*, August 15, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/world/asia/south-korea-moon-jae-in-trump.html>
48. Chung, Woosang. “President Moon’s UN Speech, Mentioning ‘Sanctions’ Four Times and ‘Peace’ 32 Times... More Emphasis on Dialogue than Sanctioning North Korea,” *Chosun Ilbo*, September 21, 2017. [in Korean] http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/09/21/2017092103544.html.
49. Jeong, Youngsoo and Rokwhan Kim. “Permitting Civic Groups to Meet Their North Korean Counterparts First Time in 506 Days,” *JoongAng Ilbo*, May 27, 2017. [in Korean] <https://news.joins.com/article/21612603>.
50. Moon, Jae-in, *People First*. Seoul: Purple Cow, 2012, p. 90.
51. Address by President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 21, 2017. <http://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=149833&pageIndex=1>.

52. Moon, *South Korea Asks*, pp. 196-97.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

54. “The Korean Peninsula New Economic Map Initiative and Realizing Economic Unification,” Ministry of National Unification, South Korea. [in Korean] <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/policy/project/task/precisionmap/>.

55. Shin, Nari. “Professor Hyun In-taek ‘Expecting Inter-Korean Relations Is an Illusion... The Situation Will Turn Worse Without Denuclearization,’” *Donga Ilbo*, February 20, 2018. [in Korean] http://news.donga.com/Main/3_all/20180220/88744122/1#csidx7bdd0f1927606bea820ae5941061ead.

56. *Hankook Ilbo*, November 29, 2017.
<http://www.hankookilbo.com/v/7b6e90af424f4b7f94307b1cf13853d7>.

57. Gil, Nayoung. “Liberty Korea Party, ‘The Government, Maintaining Two Track on North Korea’ Means That It Won’t Do Anything,” *Maeil Business Daily*, July 5, 2017. [in Korean]

58. Jaung, Hoon. “Inter-Korean Dialogue Has Just Started... Need to Continue Cooperation in the Next Generation,” *Joongang Ilbo*, May 31, 2018. [in Korean]

59. Choo, Inyoung. “77.4% Supports the Inter-Korean Summit... Approval Rating for President Moon 71.9%,” *Joongang Ilbo*, February 14, 2018. [in Korean]

60. Yonhap News, May 4, 2018.
<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2018/05/04/0200000000AKR20180504055751001.HTML>.

61. Hwang, Daejin. “The Ruling Party’s Landslide Victory,” *Chosun Ilbo*, June 14, 2018. [in Korean]
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/06/14/2018061400247.html.

62. Taylor, “For South Korean conservatives, Trump adds to deep political problems.”

63. Moon, *People First*, pp. 70-71.

64. “Panmunjeom Declaration.”

65. *Ibid.*

66. Choe, Sang-Hun. “South Korea’s Leader Proposes Broad Economic Cooperation With the North,” *New York Times*, August 15, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/world/asia/south-korea-north-moon-jae-in.html>

67. “Pyongyang Declaration.”

68. Cho, *Global Rogues and Regional Orders*.

69. Choe, Sang-Hun. "South Korea's 'balancer' policy attacked," *New York Times*, April 9, 2005. <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/09/world/asia/south-koreas-balancer-policy-attacked.html>
70. Landler, Mark and Helene Cooper, "White House Wants Pentagon to Offer More Options on North Korea," *New York Times*, February 13, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/us/politics/white-house-pentagon-north-korea.html>
71. Dias, Elizabeth. "Trump Was Calmer About North Korea This Time. That's a Sign He's Taking It Seriously," *Time*, January 31, 2018. <http://time.com/5126292/donald-trump-north-korea-state-union/>
72. "President Moon said 'Dialogue with North Korea for denuclearization'. . . Pence 'Maximum Pressure on North Korea with South Korea,'" *Joongang Ilbo*, February 8, 2018. [in Korean]
73. Burns, Robert and Foster Klug, "Trump contradicts US military stance on Korea war games," *Associated Press*, June 16, 2018. <https://www.apnews.com/c4c30dbcc81c458c9ea12b63716c1317>
74. *Ibid.*
75. In a survey conducted in June 2018, more than ninety percent of respondents oppose the US withdrawal or reduction of forces in South Korea. See Jeon, Soojin. "Trump Blasted: The US Will End Joint Military Exercises with South Korea," *Joongang Ilbo*, June 14, 2018. [in Korean] <https://news.join.com/article/22709702?cloc=joongang|home|topnewswide1>; For a discussion on the implications of the cancellation of US military exercises with South Korea, see Park, Seo-Hyun and Il Hyun Cho. "The Pentagon has officially canceled military exercises with South Korea. Here's what comes next," *Washington Post*, June 21, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/21/the-pentagon-has-now-officially-canceled-military-exercises-with-south-korea-heres-what-comes-next/?utm_term=.7b0867525904.
76. "China Announces Restrictions on Trade with North Korea," *Reuters*, April 5, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-northkorea/china-announces-restrictions-on-trade-with-north-korea-idUSKCN0X20U4>; Perlez, Jane and Chris Buckley. "China Announces Inquiry into Company Trading with North Korea," *New York Times*, September 20, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/world/asia/north-korea-china-inquiry-hongxiang.html>; Taylor, Adam. "What the New UN Sanctions on North Korea Mean," *Washington Post*, August 7, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm_term=.8dae86008a3a
77. "China proposes 'double suspension' to defuse Korean Peninsula crisis," *Xinhua*, March 8, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/08/c_136112435.htm.
78. Lee, Jongsuk. "The Faster the Declaration of the End of the Korean War, the Better," *Hankyoreh*, July 15, 2018. <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/853372.html>.
79. "Editorial: 'Stick to No Declaration of the End of the Korean War without Denuclearization,'" *Chosun Ilbo*, July 15, 2018. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/07/15/2018071501475.html.

80. *Chosun Ilbo*, July 30, 2018. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/07/30/2018073001738.html.

81. *Ibid.*

82. Kuo, Lily. "Kim Jong-un meets Xi Jinping for third time," *The Guardian*, June 19, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/19/kimjong-un-meets-xi-jinping-for-third-time>

83. Lee, Don. "China is quietly relaxing its sanctions against North Korea, complicating matters for Trump," *Los Angeles Times*, August 3, 2018.

84. "China envoy conveys President Xi Jinping's letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un." *Strait Times*, September 10, 2018. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-envoy-conveys-president-xi-jinpings-letter-to-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-un>

85. *Ibid.*

86. "China suggests sanctions relief for N. Korea after US summit," *AP News*, June 12, 2018. <https://www.apnews.comce4907a1004e41a58380504e3a3123f1>.

87. "Full text of Abe's address at UN General Assembly," *Japan Times*, September 21, 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/21/national/politics-diplomacy/full-text-abes-address-u-n-general-assembly/#.XHSkfvx7n_Q

88. President Moon's Speech at the Eastern Economic Forum Vladivostok, Russia, September 7, 2017. http://www.ytn.co.kr/_pn/0301_201709071409509209.

89. *Ibid.*

90. "President Moon's Speech at the South Korea-Russia Business Forum," *Joongang Ilbo*, June 22, 2018. [in Korean]

91. Lee, Sangheon, Hyungseob Yim, and Kyongjoon Park. "President Moon's 'Peace' Speech... An Inter-Korean-Northeast Asian Collective Prosperity Initiative Unveiled," *Yonhap News*, August 15, 2018. [in Korean]

92. Bowie, Nile. "Moon looks to SE Asia for peace and prosperity," *Asia Times*, July 15, 2018.

93. *Ibid.*

94. Yoo, Jihye. "The ARF Presidential Declaration, Deleting the CVID Clause that the Two Koreas Were Reluctant to Include... the US Overlooking It?" *Joongang Ilbo*, August 6, 2018. [in Korean] <https://news.join.com/article/22862581>

95. Mullen, Mike and Sam Nunn. "How to Deal with North Korea," *Washington Post*, September 15, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/mike-mullen-and-sam-nunn-how-to-deal-with-north-korea/2016/09/15/3baa4ade-7ab1-11e6-ac8e-cf8e0dd91dc7_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c87987f045cd
96. Miller, Steve. "Experts Unsure of Outcomes Ahead of Possible Kim Visit to Seoul, Second Summit with Trump," *Voice of America*, December 4, 2018. <https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-kim-moon-jae-in-talks/4685824.html>.
97. Wong, Edward. "Diplomacy Appears Stalled with North Korea, Despite Trump's Declarations," *New York Times*, November 7, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-arms.html>
98. Interview with President Moon's Foreign Policy and National Security Special Advisor Chung-in Moon, *JoongAng Ilbo*, October 6, 2018. [in Korean] <https://news.joins.com/article/23024338>

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

The journal accepts a manuscript on the understanding that its content is original and that it has not been accepted for publication or review elsewhere. All papers will undergo anonymous peer review. The reviewers, who are selected based on their expertise in the area of the submitted papers, will evaluate the manuscripts on the basis of creativity, quality of scholarship, and policy relevance. Once accepted for publication, copyright resides with the journal. Authors should submit their manuscripts via e-mail to peaceandwar@norwich.edu

The length of a research article should be between 7,000 and 9,000 words, including endnotes and references. Each article must include an abstract of less than 150 words and 5-6 keywords. All manuscripts should be submitted in Microsoft Word format, and text should be double-spaced, Times New Roman font point 12 (including references) and left justified.

SPELLING AND STYLE: Note that we conform to *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* and *The Chicago Manual of Style* in matters of spelling, abbreviation, punctuation, etc. On first use of an acronym or abbreviation in the manuscript, please spell it out in full.

FIGURES AND TABLES: All figures and tables should be professional in appearance. Provide figures as separate data files instead of as pictures embedded within the Word document. Location of illustrations should be indicated by a note in the text (e.g., "Table 1 about here").

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: authors must include a brief biographical sketch, including institutional affiliation, primary publications, and relevant experience. Length should be 200 words or less.

REFERENCES: JPWS uses *The Chicago Manual of Style's* notes and bibliography system with either footnotes or endnotes. For further information on references, please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 17th edition.

Books: Feldman, Lily Gardner. *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012.

Book chapters: Roehrig, Terence. "Stability or Instability? The US Response to North Korean Nuclear Weapons." In *North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence*, edited by Sung Chull Kim and Michael Cohen, 129-56. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017.

Journal articles: Glaser, Charles L. "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation," *International Security* 39: 4 (2015): 49-90.

Online sources: Bonenberger, Adrian. "The War No One Notices in Ukraine," *New York Times*, June 20, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/opinion/ukraine-russia.html> (accessed December 20, 2018).

For multiple notes referencing the same work, please use the following shortened note form after the first reference.

Feldman, Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation, 73-78.

Roehrig, "Stability or Instability?," 131.

J P W S

JOURNAL OF PEACE AND WAR STUDIES

Inaugural Issue, March 2019

CONTENTS

DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR/MISSILE CHALLENGES

Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs:
A Chinese Perspective
Zhiqun Zhu

The North Korean Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Threat:
An American Perspective
Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.

A Treasured Sword of Justice? Explaining the Key Reasons behind
North Korea's Nuclear Development and US Policy Implications
Yangmo Ku

Aligning Autonomy and Alliance: Variation in South Korea's Policy
Towards North Korea and the Moon Jae-in Presidency
Il Hyun Cho

Primacy of Diplomacy and Economic Power: How Japan Counters
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Development
Nori Katagiri

STUDENT RESEARCH

Primacy and the United States: The Role of the US in the Modern Era
William Pawlak