

JJPWS

JOURNAL OF PEACE AND WAR STUDIES

2nd Edition, October 2020



NORWICH
UNIVERSITY®

John and Mary Frances Patton Peace and War Center
Norwich University, USA

JJPWS

JOURNAL OF PEACE AND WAR STUDIES

2nd Edition, October 2020

CONTENTS

ON THE PATH TO CONFLICT? SCRUTINIZING U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY

Thucydides's Trap, Clash of Civilizations, or Divided Peace?
U.S.-China Competition from TPP to BRI to FOIP

Min Ye

China-Russia Military Cooperation and the Emergent U.S.-China Rivalry:
Implications and Recommendations for U.S. National Security

Lyle J. Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev

U.S. and Chinese Strategies, International Law, and the South China Sea

Krista E. Wiegand and Hayoun Jessie Ryou-Ellison

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Israel and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry

Zhiqun Zhu

An Irreversible Pathway? Examining the Trump Administration's
Economic Competition with China

Dawn C. Murphy

STUDENT RESEARCH

Why Wasn't Good Enough Good Enough: "Just War" in Afghanistan

John Paul Hickey

Ukraine and Russia Conflict: A Proposal to Bring Stability

Shayla Moya, Kathryn Preul, and Faith Privett

The Journal of Peace and War Studies (JPWS) aims to promote and disseminate high quality research on peace and war throughout the international academic community. It also aims to provide policy makers in the United States and many other countries with in-depth analyses of contemporary issues and policy alternatives. JPWS encompasses a wide range of research topics covering peacekeeping/peacebuilding, interstate reconciliation, transitional justice, international security, human security, cyber security, weapons of mass destruction developments, terrorism, civil wars, religious/ethnic conflicts, and historical/territorial disputes around the world. JPWS is an annual peer-reviewed journal published by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace and War Center (PAWC) at Norwich University—America’s oldest private military college and birthplace of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC).

Editor Yangmo Ku

Associate Editors Steven Sodergren
Ali Askarov
Miri Kim
Michael Thunberg

Assistant Editor Nicole Greenwood

Editorial Board Kenki Adachi, Ritsumeikan University, Japan
Felix Berenskoetter, University of London, England
Scott Crichlow, West Virginia University, USA
Clarissa Estep, West Virginia University, USA
Lily Gardner Feldman, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Linus Hagström, Swedish Defense University, Sweden
Youngjun Kim, Korea National Defense University, South Korea
Travis Morris, Norwich University, USA
Kristina Soukupova, Czech Technical University, Czech Republic
Lon Strauss, Marine Corps University, USA
Lasha Tchantouridzé, Norwich University, USA
Alexis Vahlas, University of Strasbourg, France
Jindong Yuan, University of Sydney, Australia

The opinions expressed in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of John and Mary Frances Patton Peace and War Center, Norwich University or the editors of the *Journal of Peace and War Studies*.

Copyright © 2020 by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace and War Center, Norwich University,
Printed by Norwich University Press.

ISSN 2641-841X(Print) • ISSN 2641-8428 (Online)

JOURNAL OF PEACE AND WAR STUDIES

2nd Edition, October 2020



John and Mary Frances Patton Peace and War Center
Norwich University, USA



Why Wasn't Good Enough Good Enough: “Just War” in Afghanistan

John Paul Hickey
Norwich University

Abstract: This article seeks to establish the ethical implications of Just War Theory's *jus post bellum* doctrine in the Afghanistan. I contend that America's failures there stem from the lack of a concrete war-termination vision. I assessed the problems of America's continued involvement in Afghanistan from the lens of the just war tradition using the Afghanistan War Papers. I contextualized the writings of three notable historical Just War theorists and two contemporary Just War theorists in *de jure* Just War theory: the Hague Conferences and the Geneva Conventions. Based on this theoretical foundation, I conclude that mission creep stems from a lack of a concrete vision for ending the war. This conclusion establishes the necessity for a war-termination vision, which can be assessed and evaluated because the United States has spent more lives than were lost on September 11, 2001, and nineteen years on a failed war.

Keywords: Just War Theory, U.S. foreign policy, Afghanistan, Iraq, Afghanistan Papers

Introduction

The United States' war in Afghanistan is the longest in the history of the nation. Looking back on Operation Enduring Freedom nearly nineteen years later, it is hard to get a grasp on the *raison d'être* of the American presence there today. The problems which propelled the American nation to war as the dust settled on New York City can be distilled down to three primary issues: (1) the destruction of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, (2) to topple the Taliban, and (3) to prevent future 9/11s from occurring.¹ The first two are concrete military objectives that can be verified and evaluated. The third objective, noble as it is, is less verifiable, although it is a logical consequence of the first two objectives' success. If the U.S. succeeds in the destruction of al-Qaeda and topples al-Qaeda, it would certainly help prevent another day like September 11, 2001. In the words of senior U.S. diplomat, Richard Boucher, a man closely linked to the American mission in Afghanistan: “We have to say good enough is good enough. That is why we are there 15 years later. We are trying to achieve the unachievable instead of achieving the achievable.”² Boucher, the longest-serving Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs in the history of the U.S., succinctly emphasizes the problem. Good enough was never good enough.

I contend the beginning of America's crusade in Afghanistan was just. We went to war to redress the grievance of over three thousand deaths in New York City and strike at the core of our government; the U.S. had its sense of security violently stripped in mere moments—it was a nation traumatized. I will argue, however, the ethics of the U.S.' continued involvement in Afghanistan are not as clear. Now, nineteen years later, the U.S. is negotiating for peace with a resurgent Taliban. There is no better time than now for a critical evaluation of American involvement abroad because it is essential to the future of the American system, and this article reevaluates America at war beyond the time-honored tradition of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.

In this article, I will evaluate the American war in Afghanistan through the lens of Just War Theory. I will first briefly establish the philosophical foundations for Just War Theory: Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and Carl von Clausewitz. Following the foundations of the Just War Theory, I will address two prominent modern impressions upon it: Michael Walzer and John Lango. Then, I will contextualize the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conferences as Just War Theory translated into international law in the forms of treaties and agreements. The synthesis of theory and practice will be constructed using research from the recently released Afghanistan War Papers, thousands of pages of interviews conducted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Special attention will be paid to *jus post bellum* theory, and how the U.S. failed in the cessation of hostilities and the transition from war to peace.

The Afghanistan War Papers are a unique opportunity for insight into the quagmire that America's venture into the Middle East has become. The Afghanistan War Papers confirm that the problem, fundamentally, is Mission Creep. Per Boucher, "Ultimately, we kept expanding the mission. . . If there was ever a notion of mission creep it is Afghanistan."³ The fundamental problem of America's continued involvement is that the original objectives fell by the wayside as more and more priorities were established, and people forgot the original intent of making war on Afghanistan.

Theoretical Framework

Traditionally, Just War Theory has concerned itself with the right reasons to fight—*jus ad bellum*—and the correct way to conduct oneself in war—*jus in bello*. However, recent developments in Just War Theory have taken into consideration the transition from conflict to peace, and the obligations of belligerents in the post-conflict state: dubbed *jus post bellum*.⁴

The just war tradition, at its foundation, is an attempt to establish the left and right lateral limits for conduct in all stages of war. These ideas are not new ones, and people have been talking about them through much of human history. Among the numerous names associated with this tradition are Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and Carl von Clausewitz. Within the Just War Tradition, two elements have traditionally been recognized: *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. However, in this evaluation, I will consider the more recent development of *jus post bellum*. Although all three merit individual and careful consideration, like fingers in a fist, it is the sum of the parts that matter most. The tenets of this theory at large are not static elements, implacable in their meaning.

Augustine of Hippo, Catholic Saint, and author of *City of God*, approach Just War Theory as an extension of his religion. In a letter to Boniface, Augustine states:

Peace should be the object of your desire; war should be waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity and preserve them in peace. For peace is not sought in order to the kindling of war, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained. Therefore, even in waging war, cherish the spirit of a peacemaker, that, by conquering those whom you attack, you may lead them back to the advantages of peace.⁵

Augustine states here that there is no place for unrestricted warfare. He establishes several requisites before the sword is drawn. Firstly, the ultimate end to your violence is peace: for both you *and* your opponent. This directly speaks to *jus ad bellum* theory and hints at *jus post bellum*. Secondly, "even in waging war, cherish the spirit of a peacemaker," which places limits on conduct as a combatant—the just war of Augustine was not a war of annihilation.⁶

Further developing the *jus ad bellum* aspect of his philosophy, Augustine wrote "a just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."⁷ War ought to be the act of redressing a grievance. These two quotes illustrate that Augustine did not see war as anarchy and that there are expectations for conduct in war—expectations for going to war and for engaging in combat within.

In the same tradition, Thomas Aquinas is one of the most prolific writers on peace and war among the Christian canon. In considering war, he asserts that three explicit criteria must be met, with a fourth via implication. The criteria are sovereign authority, just cause, and right intent.⁸ In right intent, there is a positive and negative component: positively, the aim of peace, negatively, the avoidance of a wrong intention.⁹ Aquinas' emphasis on a sovereign authority is significant because it separates the private individual from the ruler who has been entrusted with the protection of the commonwealth.¹⁰ War is not for the good of an individual or private party but rather for furthering the common good of society.

The subsequent development of justice and war, using words borrowed from Augustine, Aquinas wrote "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, or punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good."¹¹ This statement further affirms intent is critical to justice.

A third pillar in the construction of Just War Theory is Carl von Clausewitz. In his *magnum opus*, *On War*, he develops war as a science. Augustine and Aquinas wrote in the Christian tradition, while Clausewitz diverges from this entirely. Although Clausewitz ruminated over war to a far greater extent than either Augustine or Aquinas, his conclusions on war are not so different.

Clausewitz, writing on war, rigorously analyzed interstate conflict in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A necessary consideration must be made when reading Clausewitz: the world in which he is writing is a far cry from contemporary society. Clausewitz's philosophy on war is based on country pitted against a country, but some lessons apply to the new style of decentralized, non-state warfare being waged around the globe. Clausewitz's theories cast aspersion on modern warfare: he sought to close with the enemy at their strongest point and defeat them.

However, with regard to America in Afghanistan, his emphasis on the political objective as the foundation for war remains critical. An oft-quoted aphorism of his is that war “is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”¹² Throughout *On War*, he emphasizes the importance of politics. For example, he writes, “Politics is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument.”¹³ Almost *ad nauseum*, Clausewitz stresses that it is the political objective that should guide action. A crucial qualifier for the political aim comes in the ninth chapter of Book Eight: “We would emphasize the essential and general; leave scope for the individual and accidental; but remove everything *arbitrary, unsubstantiated, trivial, far-fetched* or *supersubtle*.”¹⁴ Although he recognized that political aims might change in war, he also entreats leaders towards concrete and evaluable courses of action with a focus.

Clausewitz, without explicitly stating it, develops here that there must be an overriding and consistent political aim to war. War, the tool of the political body, needs a steady objective to be effective and prevent blowback. In Afghanistan, a consistent political aim seems to have been elusive. Moreover, a constant political objective *in conflict* would lend to less friction during the transition from conflict to peace.

These three authors have thoroughly developed *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* as concepts with regards to what the reasonable limits for conduct in war ought to be. However, *jus post bellum* theory sorely lacks for development in comparison to its sister terms. The transition to peace from conflict is an afterthought for most. The change is an expectation; unfortunately, this expectation does not always come to fruition.

It is necessary to evaluate the three pillars of Just War Theory as independent from one another. The question of the right reason for going to war is, in many ways, distinct from the issue of the right way to wage war. The way war is waged cannot be considered in a vacuum because if the means employed will be a matter of consideration at the end of the conflict.

The ultimate failure of the U.S. in Afghanistan is not found in its lack of martial prowess. The U.S. was brutally effective in closing with and destroying the enemy. In fact, “the world’s lone superpower had pounded Afghanistan’s Islamist occupiers into the ground” by January 2002.¹⁵ *Jus post bellum* doctrine would dictate that we move on and bring sustainable, just peace to Afghanistan and leave a budding flower in the arid deserts of Central Asia.

But we didn’t. Richard Boucher, in a Lessons Learned Interview conducted by SIGAR on October 15, 2015, explains the problem: “First, we went in to get al-Qaeda, and to get al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan, and even without killing bin Laden we did that. The Taliban was shooting back at us, so we started shooting at them and they became the enemy.”¹⁶ For America in Afghanistan, good enough has never been good enough.

Just War Theory Today

Just War Theorists today, Michael Walzer and John Lango notable among them, have

helped further construct concepts such as the "sliding scale," which Walzer introduced in *Just and Unjust Wars* in 1977. Lango's work *Ethics of Armed Conflict: A Cosmopolitan Just War Theory* in 2014 took a broader approach to Just War Theory, from interstate conflict to wars on terror. These two authors helped reinvigorate the study of the Just War tradition. Of critical importance is the implication of Walzer's sliding scale: just war theory is a bed of shifting sand that is continually moving. There are few constants, and evaluation needs to be ongoing.

Of manifestations of Just War Theory in law, the Hague Conferences and Geneva Conventions are the two most recognizable. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the first multilateral treaties to engage in limiting conduct in war.¹⁷ The Geneva Conventions have dictated the terms of significant conflict across the world since their ratification. Both series of treaties were intended to restrict the conduct of nations at war and the treatment of non-combatants. Importantly, these international treaties do not apply to belligerents not engaged in interstate conflict. Furthermore, neither the Hague Conferences nor the Geneva Convention directly addresses the ethics of ending a war. As valuable as they are, a critical element of the trinity of modern Just War Theory is missing: *jus post bellum*.

To create a reasonable working definition for the least understood aspect of this trinity, we will consider *jus post bellum* as the synthesis of three separate ideas: *jus*, *post*, and *bellum*. There are two implications of *jus*: a system of laws, or justice itself.¹⁸ These "laws" are separate from transitional justice or the responsibility to protect.¹⁹ Instead, they focus on "sustainable peace" and "democratic inclusion."²⁰ Sustainable peace and democratic inclusion for Afghanistan did not seem to figure high on the U.S.' priorities during the shift in focus from Afghanistan to Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz is emblematic of the issue of America's political aim and lack of focus. Wolfowitz, under President George W. Bush, was the outspoken champion of America's pivot into Iraq. Wolfowitz's actions and recommendations, in the broadest sense, show the most glaring example of Mission Creep in the American intervention in Afghanistan. His drive towards Iraq and out of Afghanistan was Mission Creep in the extreme.

Per Jennifer Easterday, "one of the real difficulties in discussing *jus post bellum* is the concept of 'post' When does *jus in bello* end and *jus post bellum* begin?"²¹ *Jus post bellum* theory should encourage "coherence in justifications for courses of action that have post-conflict consequences."²² What justification was there for leaving Afghanistan's wounds to fester and giving al-Qaeda a vacuum to recover in?²³

Jus post bellum's considerations are essential to the way modern war is waged because the war of today is often not a war of nation-states locked in an intimate and deadly embrace. The war of today requires a clear political objective that can be evaluated, and for the belligerents to be held accountable for their conduct and to be mindful of the implications of their actions beyond the first and second order. In this case, the U.S. toppling the Taliban without consideration for what would come next proved to be a painful misstep for which

the U.S. suffered and suffers still.

An American Leviathan in the Middle East

In this section, I will address several examples in which the U.S. violated the just war tradition's expectations for the cessation of hostilities or the responsibilities for an ethical transition from conflict to peace.

America's 2001 foray into Afghanistan was not its first, and more, unfortunately, has not been its last. As a result of the American presence in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. came out of the shadows of its covert legacy and brought American primacy into the light. In the days, months, and years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been guided by two overarching imperatives: to destroy al-Qaeda and to bring the Taliban to heel.

In drawing its sword, America sought to redress a grievance that an enemy had not dared to impose upon them since Pearl Harbor. Americans across the country had a reason to rally around the flag. In the days following September 11, the objectives for America's retribution campaign shifted, but two core visions remained: bringing al-Qaeda to justice and punishing the Taliban for harboring them.²⁴ How these common denominators translated into action was less than intuitive; instead of targeted strikes on al-Qaeda utilizing America's Special Operations Forces, the Taliban would bear the brunt of the American counterstroke.²⁵ The decision to focus on the Taliban guaranteed a far more significant endeavor and a far higher risk of collateral damage. The U.S.' response rated as a flashlight as opposed to a laser pointer. The American response raises critical questions: "If the Taliban were removed, who or what would follow them? And what would be the effect on stability in Afghanistan and the surrounding region?"²⁶ The U.S. gave up the initiative by opting for a more extensive response as opposed to a focused, targeted, and deliberate strike against bin Laden's al-Qaeda.

As many of their key leaders lay dead or fled from major cities like Kabul, the Taliban were in no position to make demands by January 2002. Many of them were ready and willing to capitulate, according to Barnett Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan in his Lessons Learned interview: "Key Taliban leaders were interested in giving the new system a chance, but we didn't give them a chance."²⁷ The Taliban, bloodied and broken, had little choice. This is a problem of paramount importance to evaluating the justice of American actions in the Middle East and returns to the question of mission creep once again.

In established *jus post bellum* doctrine above, this does not satisfy a war-termination vision that would promote a sustained peace after the conflict. There was no plan or consideration for the cost of toppling the regime or the aftermath which would follow. Even after toppling the Taliban, the U.S. did not capitalize on the opportunity for diplomacy—for politicking—to take the reins and find peace. Good enough was not good enough.

According to the World Bank, Afghanistan's GDP was US\$4.055 billion in 2002, while America's over 2,700 times larger, at US\$10.986 trillion.²⁸ When the U.S. began pouring money into Afghanistan, a whole new slew of problems percolated. Namely corruption. In an interview conducted by SIGAR, a former U.S. Agency for International Development official used an analogy to describe the money erupting into Afghanistan: "It's like pouring a lot of water into a funnel; if you pour it too fast, the water overflows that funnel onto the ground. We were flooding the ground."²⁹ The intense economic intervention proved to be another policy for which the U.S. did not thoroughly plan or fully consider. Infusion of capital into Afghanistan could have been critical to rebuilding the country. Still, without a thorough evaluation of the policy's execution, it was able to become a festering wound in the Afghanistan.

Various interviewees repeatedly address the idea of the money injected into Afghanistan being too much too fast in Lessons Learned: "You just cannot put those amounts of money into a very fragile state and society, and not have it fuel corruption. You just can't."³⁰ This injection of funds was occurring concurrently with the American military effort in Afghanistan, another example of mission creep. Noble, but still contributing to the overall problem of America's lack of focus.

Gert Berthold, the former forensic operations manager for anti-corruption in Afghanistan, painted a stark picture in a Lessons Learned interview with SIGAR on October 6, 2015: of the 3,000 active contracts operating in Afghanistan, an average of 18% of contract money went to either the Taliban or other radical Islamist groups in the country.³¹ Further estimations revealed that of US\$106 billion in contracts, 25% went to transnational crime and insurgency, and an additional 15% went to transnational crime and government corruption.³² Chris Kolenda, retired Army Colonel and strategic advisor, asserted that the issue of Afghanistan's corruption was that a full-blown kleptocracy had developed in Afghanistan. In this flawed system, positions were being bought with "the expectation that you'd recoup the costs, through cuts from assistance programs, selling ammo or uniforms on the black market, drug trafficking, or kidnapping" as opposed to national service.³³ Afghanistan had established operating procedures in which classic patronage was not taboo; the transition to a system in which government positions were bought, sold, and rented severely undermined any sense of legitimacy the interim government might have been able to garner.³⁴

The kleptocracy, which the U.S. was aware of, was directly antithetical to sustainable peace. The fact that the U.S. tolerated—and through its inaction condoned—the corruption is of much greater concern. Worse still, the fact that "The strategy became self-validating. Every data point was altered to present the best picture possible," according to U.S. military advisor, Colonel Bob Crowley.³⁵ Capital infusion is not inherently just or unjust, but as part of an ongoing war effort, it needs to be critically evaluated. Could American dollars in Afghanistan have helped build a better country? Absolutely. However, the infusion of funds became problematic because there was no consideration for where the funds were going or

how they being used.

Military leaders in the U.S. gave their citizens half-truths and equivocations. The U.S. politico-military structure in Afghanistan stifled its members from criticizing the mission. This problem is remarked upon by former Colonel Crowley, who worked as a military advisor in Afghanistan:

Bad news was often stifled, there was more freedom to share bad news if it was small—we're running over kids with our MRAPs [armored vehicles]—because those things could be changed with policy directives. But when we tried to air larger strategic concerns about the willingness, capacity or corruption of the Afghan government, it was clear it wasn't welcome.³⁶

Leadership opted for quick-fixes and simple solutions in lieu of taking a long, hard look at the real issues. Supplementing the unwillingness to address more pressing issues, there was an excess of small metrics that were used to validate the American presence in Afghanistan. These metrics, however, lacked any explanation as to how they equated to something concrete and positive on a larger scale:

There was not a willingness to answer questions such as, what is the meaning of this number of schools you have built? How has that progressed you towards your goal? What is the meaning of the number of students who are, in some way, shape or form taking an English language class? What is the meaning of laudable of the number of girls in schools? How do you show this as evidence of success and not just evidence of effort or evidence of just doing a good thing?³⁷

Schools could have been critical to rebuilding Afghanistan. The question above, posed by John Garofono, forces evaluation as to what “success” should have constituted. What would “justice” have constituted? In any situation, let alone in an occupation eight time zones away from its command apparatus, any group would be hard-pressed to succeed if they do not have an objective to work towards. This raises the question at the core of Just War Theory: what is just? I contend that in the U.S., a secular country, there is no objective justice towards which their leadership aspires. Justice in the U.S. is a derivative of the democratic foundations of the body politic and is liable to change. Therefore, the justice (or injustice) in the actions of the U.S. is political. Justice is just until the moment the checks and balances in the system decide it is not.

Another problem that was pervasive through the Afghanistan conflict is that America was “devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan—we didn't know what we were doing.”³⁸ The fact that Douglas Lute, a lieutenant general who went on to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, lacked an understanding of Afghanistan shows the glaring issue which the reconstruction and nation-building present: Afghanistan is not the U.S. This fact may seem culturally and historically insignificant, but the former governor of Kandahar province, Tooryalai Wesa, remarked upon this issue in a Lessons Learned interview. Reflecting on a directive from an American contractor who sought to distribute tractors in Kandahar, Wesa said, “the social structure is complicated, you will never know to whom you should give these tractors.”³⁹ Due to the social complexities in the region, Wesa recommended a mechanized agri-center which would loan out the farm equipment at a rate lower than the market, and he felt that the contractor understood his stance; much to Wesa's dismay, the contractor, distributed the farm equipment despite his recommendation.⁴⁰ Shortly after that, one tractor was burned by insurgents, one

"broke," and one had been stolen.⁴¹ Wesa's small example shows a more significant problem: the U.S. did not understand Afghanistan.

The humanitarian mission in the Middle East, which the U.S. embarked upon, is a compelling reason for the prolongment of the war. The issue with the humanitarian mission is that it was not a primary directive in the American military's riposte in the wake of September 11. The humanitarian mission was critical to much of the successes the U.S. had. Still, I contend that the humanitarian mission interfered with the military one, and both suffered for it.

A problematic reason for extending the war, but an altogether legitimate one, is the military-industrial complex's lobbies and draw on American politics. Under President George W. Bush, one of the clearest examples of the complex's subversion of the American will is Dick Cheney, himself, the former head of defense contractor Halliburton. America's ongoing participation in the Middle East (and elsewhere) needs to be evaluated. A war in Afghanistan, which Bush and his cabinet were careful to call the ongoing fight against terrorism, expanded budgets and mobilized the U.S. Those inflated budgets and mobilized funds went directly to the seemingly numberless contractors that comprise the complex. How much of America's involvement is the byproduct of the war industry? How much of it is related to legitimate threats to American interests and national security? These questions cut to the core of the U.S. involvement in the war through military industrial complex's lobbyists.

Everything afterward—Iraq, Afghanistan again, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and so on—needs to be critically evaluated. What were the inherent risks to American interests? Risks to allowing an enemy to control geopolitical assets? These questions, and others like them, seem to push closer and closer to the fact that the military-industrial complex, a leviathan lurking beneath the surface of American politics, has a role to play.

More difficult to assess is the mission to prevent the continued evolution of terrorist organizations in the Middle East after the U.S.' rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan. Had the U.S. maintained its focus in Afghanistan, it is entirely likely that a lawful and popular government could have filled the vacuum left by the American withdrawal. Essentially, the issue of terrorist groups in Afghanistan is a symptom of the deeper problem, which was America moving on from Afghanistan before "getting the job done," so to speak. The prolongment of conflict there to fight terrorism is legitimate, but had the U.S. done its due diligence in its first foray to Afghanistan, it is reasonable to assert that the problem would be significantly diminished.

The issues in this section stem from one fundamental problem: no war-termination vision. This underlying problem manifested itself as Mission Creep. Had the U.S. remained steadfast in its initial objectives—destroying al-Qaeda and toppling the Taliban—and said good enough is good enough, the whole slew of problems above could have been avoided.

With regards to *jus post bellum* theory, had the U.S. stuck to their initial plan—revenge

against al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies—and said, “Mission Accomplished,” Afghanistan would be a far different place today.

Conclusion

The American war in Afghanistan raises some difficult questions—ones that will not be answered easily. Representative Eliot Engel, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, addressed the problems of Afghanistan and did not shy away from the dismaying reality of Afghanistan today. Engel invokes Bush’s speech to the Virginia Military Institute, in which he says, “the history of military conflict in Afghanistan has been one of initial success, followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure. We’re not going to repeat that mistake.”⁴² Among the issues he cites explicitly, foremost among them is a distraction or mission creep by any other name; the U.S. took its eye off of the ball in Afghanistan.⁴³ This distraction has costed the U.S., and of greater importance Afghanistan, a chance at sustainable peace.

The failure of the U.S. to broker peace in Afghanistan has resulted in “more than 2,000 American lives lost and thousands more wounded. More than 60,000 Afghan deaths. And more than US\$900 billion spent on a war that has dragged on for almost two decades.”⁴⁴ Worse still, the ones trusted to bring peace and liberty to a nation eight time zones away told bald-faced lies for the better part of those two decades.⁴⁵ In light of the failures and the lies, of the lives lost and treasure spent, a time for reflection and reevaluation has come. This is the time to consider *jus post bellum*’s obligations: a war-termination vision suited to bringing sustainable, just peace chief among them. As the U.S. hopes to close this painful chapter of its history and begin the next with, perhaps, more scars and wisdom, the questions raised by the SIGAR investigation *must* not be forgotten.

John Paul Hickey is a senior at Norwich University and a fourth-year cadet in the Corps of Cadets. He has studied history all four years and recently concluded a semester abroad in Germany. He is interested in history, philosophy, and political violence. One of his professors thinks he reads too much Tolkien.

Endnotes

1. "Engel Opening Statement at Full Committee Hearing." House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2020. <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2020/1/engel-opening-statement-at-full-committee-hearing-on-u-s-lessons-learned-in-afghanistan>
2. Whitlock, Craig, Leslie Shapiro, and Armand Emamdjomeh. "The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War." *The Washington Post*, December 9, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/>
3. Ibid.
4. Stahns, Carsten, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson, ed. *Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3; Bass, Gary. "Jus Post Bellum," published in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 384.
5. Parsons, Wilfrid. "189 To Count Boniface." in *The Fathers of the Church*, Volume 30 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1955), 268.
6. Ibid.
7. Wells, Samuel. *Christian Ethics: An Introductory Reader* (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell Ltd, 2010), 79.
8. Johnson, James Turner. "Aquinas and Luther on War and Peace: Sovereign Authority and the Use of Armed Force," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 31, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 8.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.
13. Ibid., 607.
14. Ibid., 632-633.
15. Hirsh, Michael. "Why Afghanistan is America's Greatest Strategic Disaster." *Foreign Policy*, February 21, 2020. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/21/afghanistan-war-taliban-peace-america-greatest-strategic-disaster/>
16. Whitlock, Shapiro, and Emamdjomeh, "The Afghanistan Papers."
17. Avalon Project, "The Laws of War." https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/lawwar.asp
18. Easterday, Jennifer. "Remarks by Jennifer Easterday." *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 2012* (American Society of International Law): 106.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 336.

23. Hirsh, "Why Afghanistan is America's Greatest Strategic Disaster."

24. Conetta, Carl. "Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War." *Research Monograph 6* (Cambridge: Commonwealth Institute, 2002), 10.

25. Ibid., 9.

26. Ibid., 12.

27. Whitlock, Shapiro, and Emamdjomeh, "The Afghanistan Papers."

28. World Bank, "Economy and Growth." <https://data.worldbank.org/topic/economy-and-growth>

29. Whitlock, Shapiro, and Emamdjomeh, "The Afghanistan Papers."

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. "Engel Opening Statement at Full Committee Hearing."

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

The journal accepts a manuscript on the understanding that its content is original and that it has not been accepted for publication or review elsewhere. All papers will undergo anonymous peer review. The reviewers, who are selected based on their expertise in the area of the submitted papers, will evaluate the manuscripts on the basis of creativity, quality of scholarship, and policy relevance. Once accepted for publication, copyright resides with the journal. Authors should submit their manuscripts via e-mail to peaceandwar@norwich.edu

The length of a research article should be between 7,000 and 9,000 words (student papers: 5,000-7,000 words), including endnotes and references. Each article must include an abstract of less than 200 words and 5-6 keywords. All manuscripts should be submitted in Microsoft Word format, and text should be double-spaced, Times New Roman font point 12 (including references) and left justified.

SPELLING AND STYLE: Note that we conform to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary and The Chicago Manual of Style in matters of spelling, abbreviation, punctuation, etc. On first use of an acronym or abbreviation in the manuscript, please spell it out in full.

FIGURES AND TABLES: All figures and tables should be professional in appearance. Provide figures as separate data files instead of as pictures embedded within the Word document. Location of illustrations should be indicated by a note in the text (e.g., "Table 1 about here").

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH: authors must include a brief biographical sketch, including institutional affiliation, primary publications, and relevant experience. Length should be 200 words or less.

REFERENCES: JPWS uses The Chicago Manual of Style's notes and bibliography system with endnotes. For further information on references, please consult The Chicago Manual of Style, 17th edition.

Books: Feldman, Lily Gardner. *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 20-33.

Book chapters: Roehrig, Terence. "Stability or Instability? The US Response to North Korean Nuclear Weapons." In *North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), edited by Sung Chull Kim and Michael Cohen, 129-56.

Journal articles: Friedberg, Aaron. "The Future U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" *International Security* 32, no. 2 (2005): 7-35.

Online sources: Bonenberger, Adrian. "The War No One Notices in Ukraine," *New York Times*, June 20, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/opinion/ukraine-russia.html>

For multiple notes referencing the same work, please use the following shortened note form after the first reference.

Feldman, Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation, 73-78.

